



Toward Employment Solutions for **Youth on the Move**

July 2017

Acknowledgements

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Foreword

In 2015, amid lingering youth un- and under- employment and a complex economic, social political landscape in which labor markets were becoming more dynamic just as insecurity and mobility were on the rise, S4YE released its inaugural baseline report on the state of youth employment around the world. The report focused on low and middle income countries where the situation is arguably most pressing and where we hope to have the most impact.

Today, the employment outlook for young people still looks grim, as global trends indicate that migration – voluntary and involuntary - is bound to be a defining characteristic of the 21st century. A number of factors will ensure that mass mobility continues or even increases over the foreseeable future. Structural labor shortages in wealthier countries, together with wages that are orders of magnitude higher than in poorer countries, will continue to drive the movement of workers to seek better opportunities. Continued political instability and violence will drive families to seek security; and greater climatic volatility may displace hundreds of millions of people. Arguably these factors and the implications for employment trajectories are intensified for young people, calling for greater attention to the opportunities and risks in migration.

We are learning more all the time, and new solutions hold great promise, however the evidence and knowledge concerning the youth, migration and employment nexus is still relatively scant. This report aims to help S4YE, its collaborators and all those who work to address youth un employment, to better understand this nexus and how policy and programs can help mitigate risks to improve economic opportunity and productive employment among young migrants. We know that we all stand to gain when all young people are economically engaged, and we remain committed to identifying and advancing solutions that tap the energy, talent, and aspirations of youth on the move.

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Chair of the Board, S4YE

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Executive Summary

Youth, employment, and migration are pressing issues. In its flagship baseline report on the state of youth² employment in October 2015, S4YE³ partners agreed that “rising inequality, rising social unrest, and rising levels of movement of people around the world all herald unprecedented times—and call for unprecedented action.” Indeed, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognize the contribution of migration to inclusive growth and development, as well as migrants as a vulnerable population. Yet, evidence connecting the youth-employment-migration nexus is scant. This first S4YE annual topic report seeks to fill some information gaps on youth employment and migration by presenting global trends and patterns associated with youth on the move, the constraints they face, and potential ways to alleviate them.

This report addresses three main areas: First, it asks what evidence connects youth migration and employment trends, and what information gaps need to be filled to get a better picture of migrating youth and their employment profiles? Second, how are youth benefitting from migration, and what are the risks and constraints particularly relevant to youth on the move? Third, given what we currently know—and do not know—about young migrants, and about the benefits and vulnerabilities associated with youth on the move, what policies and programs in source and destination markets allow us to maximize the benefits of youth migration while accounting for socioeconomic realities?

Why does the youth-employment-migration nexus matter?

Youth unemployment is a growing concern globally, and will continue to worry policymakers as domestic labor markets do not keep pace with population growth. About 500 million youth across the globe were unemployed, inactive, underemployed, or working in insecure jobs in 2014. Across all regions, youth were at least twice as likely as adults to be unemployed. East Asia, where youth are four times more likely than adults to be unemployed, has the biggest gap between youth and non-youth employment. Over the next 10 years, an estimated 5 million new jobs per month would be required to accommodate young people entering the workforce to maintain current developing world employment levels (IFC, 2013). This rise in the working age population has put further pressures on many economies not able to create enough jobs.

Meanwhile, jobs are likely to remain spatially unequally distributed across the globe. Agglomeration economies mean that economic activity has clustered in leading economic areas. This has led to spatial mismatches between where job openings exist and where jobseekers are located. While moving jobs to where people are located has been a default strategy in most cases, there is also a cautionary argument that “to try to spread out economic activity is to discourage it” (World Development Report 2009). Therefore, along with ongoing efforts to spur economic

² Unless otherwise noted, “youth” refers to individuals aged 15-29 as defined by S4YE. “Youth” and “young people” are used interchangeably in this report.

³ S4YE is a partnership initiated by the World Bank, Plan International, the International Youth Foundation (IYF), Youth Business International (YBI), RAND, Accenture, and the International Labor Organization (ILO), and now a number of other public sector, private sector, and civil society partners. S4YE’s mission is to lead mobilization efforts to significantly increase the number of young people engaged in productive work by 2030. It seeks to develop innovative solutions through practical research and active engagement with public, private, and civil stakeholders to enable solutions for all youth.

activity and bring jobs to where people are located, an increasingly important option is also to better prepare and connect youth to jobs in hubs of economic activity through increased migration.

Migration offers substantial potential benefits for young migrants. It can be a fast and direct opportunity for a young worker to exit poverty. For a marginal worker in a developing country, the wage gain to a one-off period of working in the U.S. for several weeks overwhelms the present-value lifetime wage gain from some of the most effective antipoverty policy interventions rigorously documented in development economics literature (Clemens, Pritchett, and Montenegro 2008). For youth fleeing war, violence, or even constraining norms and traditions in source regions, migration can offer a chance at relative peace and prosperity, and at a higher standard of living.

Migration also delivers benefits to sending and receiving communities. By addressing labor surplus in sending areas and shortages in destination areas, migration allows for more job creation. International remittances from migrants to home countries constitute an enormous transfer of resources from wealthier to poorer nations. Moreover, many migrants return, bringing the skills as well as savings they have accumulated abroad. These skills and savings would have been difficult or impossible to accumulate had they not left, because of poor work opportunities and undeveloped financial systems at home. For host communities, young skilled migrants can be a source of innovation and technological dynamism, as well as workforce productivity.


Migration can therefore substantially benefit the global economy. Winters et al estimates that a 3% increase in labor liberalization would result in a US\$156 billion increase in global GDP (compared to a US\$104 billion increase from all remaining trade liberalization). Powerful demographic trends that pair labor shortages in aging OECD countries with labor surpluses in many developing countries mean that youth migration can address labor market needs in both sets of countries. However, along with substantial potential benefits for both migrating youth and the sending and receiving communities, there are also significant risks associated with migrant youth unemployment, which we discuss later.

What are the main patterns of youth movement?

Though data may be limited, several patterns and trends emerge:

Data makes clear that many young people are on the move. Despite representing only 21% of the global international migrant stock, youth significantly outnumber adults in terms of net migrant flows. Between 2010 and 2015, the estimated net inflow of youth of working age population was 14.8 million, while that for adults totaled 2.9 million. Figure 4 shows net inflows of working age migrants from 1990 to 2015. Net inflows of young migrants is significantly higher in all years, with a peak between 2005-2010.


Figure 1: Young people represent higher proportion of net migrant inflows



For many youth, cities are their principle destination, and more youth move within borders toward cities, rather than across borders. Urbanization data from 183 countries show that internal youth migrants moving towards cities contributes to the growing rate of urbanization, especially in developing countries. Additionally, census data reveals that youth represent a larger share of internal migrants compared to adults in select country capitals. For example, in Lima, Peru, the proportion of youth that recently migrated internally was twice that of adults, and in Hanoi, Vietnam 18% of youth were internal migrants compared to 5% of adults. Among international migrants in the United States, data shows that almost the entire immigrant population (95%) lives in a relatively small number of large cities, while only three-quarters of natives live in urban areas (Kochhar et al, 2009).

When moving internationally, young people tend to move towards neighboring countries or wealthier nations. Between 2010 and 2015, most of youth migrant inflows happened in high-income countries where there are better economic and educational opportunities. And while age-disaggregated data is not available, South Asia-to-Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa—to-Middle East and North Africa, and migration within Sub-Saharan Africa are the three most popular migration corridors in the world, further emphasizing that while North-South migration is often highlighted in popular discourse, South-South migration deserves equal attention. Figure 2 shows that South Asia to Middle East and North Africa (MENA) represents the most popular migration corridor in the world, with many migrants from South Asia seeking economic opportunities in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Migration within Sub-Saharan Africa is nearly as high.

Figure 2: International Migration Corridors




Notes: LMICs = Low and middle-income countries, HICs = High income countries.

International net migrant flows are author estimates based on *Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin* (UN 2015b). For estimation methods see section 3 of the technical appendix in the full report.

Once at their destinations, young migrants display varying work and educational patterns. Employment-wise, young migrants are more likely to be wage/salary workers than self-employed in many of the countries examined in our sample. For example, Figure 3 shows that in 10 out of the 15 countries, the gap between self-employed youth internal migrants and youth internal migrants working in wage/salary jobs was 50 percentage points or more. Self-employment rates among recent youth internal migrants are also lower than country averages in most cases. **Data also shows that in cities, there is little difference in average educational achievement among youth migrants and non-migrants.** Census data from select country capitals shows that young migrants, on average, do not differ from young natives in terms of educational attainment.

Figure 3: Comparison of employment types among youth migrants in select countries



Note: Sample of 20-29 year-olds for comparability purposes. Only includes urban populations except for countries with asterisks.

Data source: National censuses (see Appendix X in full report for more information)

Why do youth move?

Youths' decision to migrate depend on a variety of “push and pull” factors that are both economic and non-economic in nature. Globally, many more young people express higher desires to move, irrespective of their employment status, compared to older counterparts. Willingness to migrate is highest among youth aged 15-29 in Sub-Saharan Africa and lowest among adults aged 30-65 in Asia. Compared to adults, youth are more willing to migrate in most cases by over 10 percentage points.

Among economic factors, large wage differentials, income diversification, and risk aversion are among the most prominent drivers of youth migration. Large wage differentials in cities and across borders create a powerful pull incentive for young workers to make their way to urban or foreign labor markets. In a study of 42 developing countries, the median wage gap for an observably identical worker compared to the U.S. was \$15,400 per year (Clemens, Pritchett, and Montenegro 2008). Youth migration can also help families mitigate economic risks by diversifying family income portfolio spatially as well as by sector. In Mexico, for example, for a third of migrant youth, parents and not the migrant youth him or herself made the decision to migrate (Tucker et al 2013).


Linked to economic and employment outcomes, pursuing education abroad and in urban areas is gaining prominence among other drivers of youth migration. Education can also be a means of legal migration, and it can (but not always) allow easier access to foreign labor markets. The number of students enrolled in tertiary education abroad rose from 2 million in 2000 to 3.6 million in 2010, an increase of 78%. The United States was the most popular destination for foreign students, accounting for 19 per cent of the world total, while China, India, and Germany were the top sources of international students.

Among non-economic factors, family reunification, marriages, or just a desire to break away from traditional norms in home communities, also bring youth to new places. International marriages are increasingly common and may sometimes cause youth migration. While data is not available for youth, admissions of immediate relatives of citizens and migrants with permanent residence status accounted for at least half of all admissions to Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States in 2003. Furthermore, migration from rural to urban societies is associated with youth aspirations and desire to break away from traditional norms in communities of origin.

Meanwhile, significant numbers of youth are displaced by violence, armed conflict, and climate change. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), about 40 million people were forced to seek refuge within their own country, and another 21 million people—just under 10% of the global international migrant population stock—were forced to live outside their home country in 2015. It has been further estimated that up to 10 million people who migrated, or were displaced, from Africa over the last two decades moved mainly because of environmental degradation and desertification. In 2015 alone, 21.3 million people were forced to live outside their home. More than 50% of asylum-seekers in Europe in 2015 were aged between 18-34, and many countries with the greatest relative outflows of migrants shown in Figure 4 are also suffering from conflict. These countries tend to have a young population, for example, more than half of the total population in Syria (64.5%), El Salvador (55.4%), Central African Republic (68.2%), and Somalia (73.6%) are children and youth below the age of 30.

Figure 4: Countries with greatest relative outflow of migrants (2010-15)

Net Outflows 2010-2015 as percent of 2010 population



Note: Population data from WDI (2016). International migrant flows author estimates based on Trends in International migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (UN 2015b). For estimation methods see section 3 of technical appendix.

What are the risks and employment challenges associated with youth migration?

Youth migration can create “win-win-win situations” for migrants, their source communities, and their host communities. However, to realize this elusive triple-win, it is important analyze labor market challenges and risks for both source and destination markets. For youth, realizing the benefits of migration may be challenging: Successful employment outcomes for young migrants depend on many factors, including labor market structure and regulation, and access to training and other services.

The legalities around migration in both sending and receiving markets helps determine whether migration occurs and how well young migrants integrate into local economies. Very often, potential migrants, irrespective of whether they are young or old, cannot access foreign labor markets. Undocumented migration, in many cases, is the result of limited legal entry paths, restrictive employment visas, or high migration costs, all factors that are binding even before a migrant gets to access the destination labor market. Once migrants enter destination markets, lack of legal status usually means reduced or zero eligibility to access education or employment-related training. Undocumented or unauthorized migrants may be unable to get hired for certain jobs, and often lack eligibility for job-related benefits such as pensions and healthcare.

Moreover, while the evidence to generalize the link between employment outcomes and labor market regulations is still limited and anecdotal, the degree to which labor markets in destination economies are regulated—or conversely, flexible—can also affect the extent of youth migrant opportunities. There are tradeoffs associated with tightly regulated labor markets: On the one hand, they protect host or local workers; while on the other hand, regulations restrict access to certain jobs and services for migrants. As a result, migrants may be obligated to enter specific sectors or occupations that do not match their skills, or be shunted into unregulated, irregular, or informal employment. It is therefore important to seek balance in labor regulations to avoid creating a dual structure, with a protected formal sector and an unprotected informal sector.

Among young migrants who may be eligible for employment at their destinations, inadequate access to training and skills certification can prevent integration into foreign labor markets. International migrants from lower-income countries—especially younger migrants—tend to have low skills relative to those of developed host countries. Combined with the lack of relevance of their skills for local needs, this contributes to their placement in lower-end occupations. The lack of appropriate skills applies both to young international migrants and to those migrating to cities in developing countries from rural areas, where rural schooling and agricultural experience may leave them unprepared for work in urban settings. Another significant barrier is that even when possessing relevant skills, migrants may not be able to credibly signal these skills to potential employers because credentials and skills obtained in the home country are not recognized in the destination country.

Young migrants, may up disproportionately in informal and low-skill sectors with irregular employment. For youth migrants, whether internal or international, irregularity of employment is concerning for several reasons: Where such work is non-authorized and beyond the oversight and regulation of the government, it not only implies lower security, pay, and benefits, but also exposes

young people to exploitation and perhaps physical danger. Among internal rural-urban youth migrants, income gains compared to rural areas are often offset by long-term unemployment in cities.

For many migrants, and particularly for inexperienced youth, lack of access to employment services is a concern. In the EU, new arrivals without legal status, or non-EU migrants on temporary residence permits, are not eligible for employment services, or they may not know how to register or lack language facility. Employment service agencies may be reluctant to take on migrant cases whose needs are complex. Many international migrants identify jobs before they leave their home country through recruitment services that contract workers on behalf of employers in destination countries. However, exploitation and abuse under sponsorship systems are rife: Analysis of select countries shows that youth migrants are most likely to suffer consequences from lack of efficient and legal labor matching services, with over half suffering long labor hours, work-related accidents, or labor rights violations (ILO, 2013).

Young migrants also suffer from weak or non-existent networks, adding to information asymmetries in destination markets. In labor markets around the world, social and professional networks play an essential role in helping people obtain work, providing information about the labor market and specific job openings and supplying recommendations. Youth migrants are particularly vulnerable because they have lost informal social networks (relatives, neighbors, and others) that would normally look after their welfare at home. They are likely to be more socially isolated or reliant on smaller ethnic, religious, or language minority-based networks.

Young women are often especially at risk and face additional gender-related challenges. Young women migrants increasingly work in a diverse number of sectors—such as manufacturing in China, construction in India, or nursing and homecare globally—where they may face similar general gender-related, workplace constraints, including lower wages or lack of childcare. However, a large share of unskilled or undocumented women migrants find work as domestic servants. Such women, who often work and live in their employers' homes, can be invisible to authorities and become subject to low pay, restricted freedom, and sexual exploitation.

Similarly, youth economic and social integration into host communities is often hampered by cultural and linguistic barriers. Lack of familiarity with the local language and customs is one reason well-educated migrants often work in jobs below their formal qualifications. Research indicates that migrants have better employment outcomes the closer they are culturally or linguistically to the majority population (Chiswick and Miller 2011, Wanner 1998). Outcomes improve with years of residence in the country, implying that cultural barriers may be higher for young migrants. As noted above, language barriers also impede access to employment services, training, and other services. Finally, discrimination, and implicit or outright xenophobia and racism, also inhibits access to decent work and integration into the broader society.

Lastly, migrants face more acute constraints than host or local youth in accessing entrepreneurship opportunities. The S4YE baseline report (2015) showed that young people generally are among the most entrepreneurial worldwide in terms of nascent start-up activity, seeing it as a path out of poverty and joblessness. While labor market barriers may push migrants toward self-employment, they often face barriers. A key constraint among international migrants

is the difficulty, relative to host or locals, in obtaining credit. Relative to adults, young people generally are disadvantaged in accessing business start-up loans as they lack experience, borrowing and repayment histories, and collateral assets to assure lenders.

Risks faced by migrants also imply risks and challenges for sending and receiving areas.

From the perspective of sending communities, problems can arise when a large mass of young workers leave their communities in a short period, or when migration may reduce incentives for educational attainment if the jobs that young people expect to obtain from migrating are low-skilled. From the perspective of receiving countries, large influx of workers may create short to medium-term fiscal stress. Policies to compensate low-skilled native workers who may face wage competition, and efforts to encourage social cohesion, may be needed to manage the perceptions of natives regarding increased immigration.⁴

What are promising solutions?

Given the urgency of the employment and migration landscape, the global community is invigorating its response, and pursuing a number of policies and programs. The report highlights real-world examples in *five* actionable solution sets that have promise to address labor market challenges faced by young migrants. It is important to understand that youths' unmet desire to move may drive them to migrate in more dangerous or uncertain circumstances. Along with supporting activities to spur job creation domestically and promote rural or coastal development, institutions in both sending and receiving regions should implement systems to facilitate youth migration, reduce youth migrant vulnerabilities, and address factors associated with exploitation and rent-seeking that arise because of the potential for vast gains youth migrants perceive.

In looking at addressing constraints faced by youth migrants, it is also important to remember the vast diversity in migrant experiences. Given this heterogeneity in migrant experience, as well as the limited rigorous evidence, it is beyond the scope of this report to prescribe scalable policy solutions. Solutions showcased here represent examples of the kind of responses from S4YE partners and the broader international community, but not all are targeting youth migrants and few of the examples have been empirically evaluate. It is simply too early to offer directive prescriptions about solutions that can work in a broad variety of contexts, countries, or populations.

Providing legal pathways to move and work is a critical first step to ensure quality jobs for youth migrants. Immigration policies in destination markets need to align with changing labor market realities around the world. This is especially true for young as well as adult migrants at the lower end of the skills spectrum. Many western countries have tried to balance political economy constraints of migrants over-staying visas by devising temporary or circular migration programs. By addressing unemployment in sending markets and labor shortages in receiving markets, these programs may represent win-win scenarios. However, it is necessary that seasonal or temporary schemes, include basic human and labor rights standards to protect workers so they can be mutually beneficial for both the young migrants and their employers. Providing legal pathways also helps reduce exploitation and reduces pressure to enter informal employment.

⁴ A more detailed discussion of risks and challenges is presented in sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.

Improving access to employer and destination-specific training and certification can address the hurdle of skills mismatch young migrants in destination communities face. In a rapidly changing globalized economy, where education systems constantly evolve, skills and vocational training for aspiring youth migrants should be tailored towards the demand of employers in destination markets. Policymakers and training providers can facilitate this by collaborating with destination country governments or by engaging employers at receiving markets. Similarly, highly qualified youth migrants are barred from accessing employment opportunities that match their skills in destination markets because of differing certification schemes. Trans-national certification standards allow young migrants to validate their education or training and better access jobs that match qualifications, skills, and productivity levels.

Digital platforms increasingly provide employment services and reduce information asymmetries for migrants across the globe. Migrants and refugees increasingly can use mobile phones to find reliable information regarding the costs and risks of migration, which is helping vulnerable groups such as youth evaluate employment options in source and destination markets. Online platforms also provide social protection by facilitating youth migrants' access to valuable services in destination markets. Digital job-matching platforms are substantially reducing job search-costs for young migrants and refugees. Traditional employment service platforms are also incorporating new technology approaches and data to help migrants find jobs.

By helping young migrants navigate barriers to starting a business in destination communities, organizations are reducing the financial and experiential barriers to entrepreneurship. Some organizations are offering banking advice and products for those newly arrived, tailored by country of origin to serve immigrants in opening bank accounts and developing credit histories. Other organizations are assisting migrant entrepreneurship by hiring counselors experienced in dealing with migrant cases, removing language barriers by addressing communication needs, or facilitating immigrant business networking. Incubating a migrant network—helping the members of the migrant community connect, or establishing a mentorship program for young migrants to meet successful entrepreneurs—can help share critical information with aspiring migrant business-owners.

Policymakers can use innovative communal and behavioral approaches to lower cultural and language discrimination toward young migrants in destination communities. Easy-to-use platforms can help connect new migrants and refugees with their ethnic community to ease their transition to host societies. Interacting with people from the same ethnic community can help young migrants understand the rules and regulations of their destination communities and smooth transition from one cultural to another. Similarly, policymakers can address formal labor market discrimination by using new, innovative, behavioral science approaches. For example, by anonymizing applications for employment, policymakers can help reduce discrimination and bias that migrants may face in destination communities.

Where do we go from here?

We explored patterns and trends regarding youth on the move, highlighted labor market challenges in realizing the benefits from youth migration, and showcased examples of promising programs and policies to alleviate some constraints. The youth-employment-migration nexus is an important and underexplored area in the global push towards inclusive

economic growth through jobs. Youth move for a variety of reasons—economic and non-economic—and youth data suggests increased future movement. To facilitate safe and orderly migration—an important component of the SDG agenda—we need to address risks and challenges youth face. We need to bring issues such as legal access to destination markets, skills, employability, and barriers to migration to the front and center in global policy debates. Promising programs that address these barriers, such as the ones discussed in this report, need to be evaluated rigorously to identify concrete policies and scale-up the best solutions. At the same time, political economy considerations will likely significantly affect migrant policy and program scalability. The concerns of people in host communities, many of whom remain deeply opposed to more immigration because of labor competition and fiscal cost implications, must also be addressed.

Based on the themes in this report, the agenda for youth migration needs to focus on three key elements:

- Data gaps,
- Experimentation, and
- Partnerships

Data and research on migration should address specific knowledge gaps and distinguish youth and older migrants in terms of risks and opportunities. We need to better understand youth movements; who is going where, and what kind of work they are, or are not, engaging in when they arrive. More age-disaggregated data is needed for international and internal migrants. Even baseline age-disaggregated data on stocks and flows of migrants is spotty and missing in many key corridors. Detailed data by age, gender, and skill and education level is important. We need more research needs to understand employment opportunities for youth in their domestic markets, and how they compare to employment outcomes and income after migration. We need to know more about their occupation and sectoral distribution relative to adult migrants and host or local youths.

Further research is also needed to gain a deeper, more nuanced and contextual understanding of specific constraints young migrants face in accessing employment, and how these vary by person and place. S4YE partners already have ongoing work programs to support building a youth employment and migration knowledge and policy base. However, we need more rigorous evidence for what works, why, for whom, and in what contexts. There is also very little data or knowledge on youth cohorts in forcibly displaced populations. Similarly, we need to know more about how gender factors in the youth-employment-migration nexus. Table 1 provides a framework to guide, categorize, and collect evidence around solutions, constraints, and S4YE Frontier areas for prioritized activities.

Table 1: Matching constraints and solutions for improving migrant youth employment

| Constraints | Solution Sets | S4YE Pathway to Youth Employment | Relevant Frontier Areas |
|--|--|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restrictive legal frameworks for migration • Labor market rigidities and structures | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing legal pathways to move and work for migrants and refugees | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government and non-governmental factors influencing youth employment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality Jobs |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate access to training or certification of skills | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving access to destination and employer-specific training and certification | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training & skills development • Identifying skills gaps, remedial basic skills | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skills gap |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irregularity of employment • Lack of access to employment services • Weak networks, inadequate information | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reducing information asymmetries, service provision through digital platforms | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job search and acquisition | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality Jobs; Digital Age Impact |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barriers to entrepreneurship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reducing financial and experiential barriers to entrepreneurship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enterprise development • Business growth and expansion | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-Employment & Entrepreneurship |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural and language barriers and discrimination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lowering cultural barriers to live and work in destination markets | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job search and acquisition • Job retention | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality Jobs, Digital Age Impact |

Increasing investments and strengthening partnerships among multi-sector actors remains critical. S4YE partners are expanding their support to youth on the move; targeting, adapting, and piloting proven youth employment interventions. Within the World Bank, the Social Protection & Jobs practice has large and growing work programs on both migration and youth employment. At the same time, gaps in evidence noted above point toward additional youth migration and employment questions and research needs. Many of the questions put forth in the S4YE Baseline Report's future research agenda also apply to youth on the move. S4YE will continue to invest resources and efforts in these areas.

CHAPTER ONE: A GENERATION ON THE MOVE – SITUATIONAL AND MOTIVATIONAL LANDSCAPE

1.1 Introduction

In October 2014, with worldwide youth joblessness lingering at about 13% worldwide, the Solutions for Youth Employment Coalition (S4YE) formed to positively disrupt the youth⁵ employment landscape.

S4YE, a partnership initiated by the World Bank, Plan International, the International Youth Foundation (IYF), Youth Business International (YBI), RAND, Accenture, and the International Labor Organization (ILO), seeks to foster a world where all youth have access to work opportunities.

S4YE's mission is to lead and mobilize efforts to significantly increase the number of young people engaged in productive work by 2030. It seeks to develop innovative solutions through practical research and active engagement with public, private and civil stakeholders, to enable solutions for all youth at scale.

In October 2015, S4YE released its flagship baseline report on the state of youth employment. The report recognized that “Rising inequality, rising social unrest, and rising levels of movement of people around the world all herald unprecedented times – and call for unprecedented action.” The report identified critical aspects of this trend for further exploration; among these was the “youth-employment-migration nexus,” likely to be an important part of the youth employment story in coming years. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognize the contribution of migration to inclusive growth and development, as well as migrants as a vulnerable population warranting international cooperation “to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons”.⁶

Exploration of youth employment dynamics remains important. Roughly half of the world's population is under age 30, and 85 % live in developing countries. (S4YE 2015) As many as 40% of populations in lower and middle-income countries and fragile states are youth (UN 2016) and their employment situation remains grim; in 2015 the ILO reported an increase in the global youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24) from 12.9 to 13.1% (ILO WESO 2016). Roughly 500 million youth were unemployed, inactive, underemployed, or working in insecure jobs in 2014. (S4YE 2015) More than one third (37%) of youth (aged 15-24) who are employed can still be considered poor, living on less than \$3.10 a day. (ILO 2016) Across all regions, youth are at least twice as likely as adults to be unemployed; the biggest gap between youth and non-youth employment is in East Asia, where youth are four times more likely than adults to be unemployed. (S4YE 2015)

Youth unemployment warrants particular attention as a factor of global prosperity and security. Unemployment of any type is a strain on an economy and society, weakening

⁵ Unless otherwise stated, youth refers to individuals aged 15-29, per S4YE definition.

⁶ United Nations Resolution A/res/70/1 *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*.

productivity, investment, and spending to inhibit growth. These negative effects are particularly potent when looking at youth. Without further training or upskilling, delayed entry into the labor market and low-wage jobs can be particularly harmful during the first few years in the labor force, as they limit lifetime-earning, stall skill development, and increase the likelihood of later joblessness. Unemployment and idleness have the potential to increase inequality and inflame social tensions.

Youth employment prospects could worsen in coming years. Over the next 10 years, an estimated 5 million jobs per month are required to accommodate young people entering the workforce to maintain current employment levels in the developing world (IFC, 2013). Studies have shown that the financial crisis and global recession of the last decade significantly contributed to youth unemployment, with as much as 50 percent of youth unemployment in the Eurozone attributed to it. In part, this is because youth labor market outcomes are more exposed to economic shocks for a number of structural reasons; they tend to hold a disproportionate share of contract or temporary jobs that are less durable and/or protected (Banerji et al 2014; Lundberg et al 2012). In Europe for example, youth part-time employment as a share of total employment was 25 per cent in 2011, and another 40.5 per cent of employed youth in the region worked on temporary contracts (ILO 2013). In low-income countries, school to work transition surveys revealed that at least three in four young workers fall within the category of irregular employment, engaged either in own-account work, contributing family work, casual paid employment or temporary (non-casual) labor. (ILO 2015)

“Young people continue to suffer disproportionately from decent work deficits and low-quality jobs measured in terms of working poverty, low pay and/or employment status, and exposure to occupational hazards and injury. Increasingly, young workers may lack options in the formal sector to move to full-time employment from part-time, temporary, casual or seasonal employment. In the informal economy, young people frequently work under poor conditions in both urban and rural areas” (ILO 2012).

At the same time, the rise in the working age population has put further pressure on many economies in the Global South not able to create enough jobs. Table 1 below shows the change in working age population from 2015-2050 and the corresponding change in employment needed to keep the employment rates at 2015 level. Most of the difference is likely to consist of economically inactive persons, and in the case of youth, many may be in education as average levels of education increases and people delay their entry into the labor force. Nonetheless, serious efforts need to continue to be made to create jobs in these countries in response to these dynamics as this pressure is likely to be relieved via a combination of domestic jobs including self-employment and both internal and international migration. Cross-border migration from areas lagging in employment are likely to increase in the future.

Table 1: Implications of demographic projections for unemployment and inactivity in the developing world by 2050⁷

| | Change in working age population, 2015-2050, (million) | Change in employment, 2015-2050, needed to keep employment at 2015 level (million) | Inactivity, unemployment, and "migration pressure" created by the unemployed (million) |
|------------------------------|--|--|--|
| | (A) | (B) | (A - B) |
| All developing countries | 2,119 | 1,243 | 875 |
| East Asia and Pacific | 200 | 135 | 65 |
| Europe and Central Asia | 8 | 4 | 4 |
| Latin America and Caribbean | 179 | 109 | 70 |
| Middle East and North Africa | 204 | 84 | 120 |
| South Asia | 600 | 317 | 283 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 928 | 595 | 333 |
| High Income: OECD | 78 | 44 | 35 |

Chart Reference: ILO Trends Econometric Models and UN World Population Prospects 2015

Migration offers much-needed expansion of opportunities for young workers and jobseekers who are increasingly mired in worsening employment scenarios. The principal response to employment concerns in the development community of trying to spread economic activity to lagging areas has encountered limits. Due to agglomeration economies, economic activity tends to concentrate, meaning that “To try to spread out economic activity is to discourage it.” (World Development Report 2009). At the same time, technological change and the consequent breakdown of production processes signals a reverse trend. Still, jobs, perhaps even more acutely, wages, are likely to remain spatially unequally distributed across the globe.

In addition to more effective employment policies and practices in source communities, including by investing in rural development and making agriculture more attractive to youth, young people in economically remote and lagging areas need support to better prepare them for, and facilitate access or move to, hubs of economic activity. The table above demonstrates the gap between changes in workforce and change in employment as “migration pressure;” that is, the number of people entering the workforce who would likely be either in education or out of a job if they did not migrate or go into self-employment. However, labor movement often remains low, trapping workers in low productivity places leading to higher unemployment and lower wages. This is a result of limited number of regular channels for labor migration, as well as inadequate integration and ease of internal and international labor mobility (as opposed to capital and goods markets which are highly integrated) which has a number of effects discussed in Chapter Two.

Hence, an increased liberalization of labor markets as well as compliance and application of international labor standards that protect workers’ rights, could facilitate migration and labor market and socio-economic outcomes of young workers. As further discussed below,

⁷ <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/468881473870347506/Migration-and-Development-Report-Sept2016.pdf>

large wage differentials in cities and across borders create a powerful pull incentive for young workers to make their way to urban or foreign labor markets. Thus, migration in contexts where human rights and international labor standards are respected, could be a fast and direct opportunity for young workers to exit poverty and raise their standard of living.

Expanding youth employment opportunities through migration also offers potential gains for the global economy. Winters et al (2003) estimate that a mere 3% increase in labor liberalization would result in \$156 billion increase in global GDP (compared to a \$104 billion increase from all remaining trade liberalization). Powerful demographic trends that pair labor shortages in OECD countries with labor surpluses in many developing countries mean that youth migration is a means to address labor market needs in both sets of countries. On the one hand, advanced economies in Europe, North America, and Japan have aging populations due to declines in fertility rates and gains in longevity, leading to a reduction in the working age population. During the first decade of the 21st century, international migrants have accounted for more than half of the growth in the labor force of OECD countries, and in cases such as the UK or Italy more than 100% (as the domestic labor force shrank). (Dustmann 2011) While on the other hand, as noted earlier, many developing countries have younger populations and more favorable workforce demographics.

However, high risks associated with migrant youth unemployment and underemployment call for a special focus on their needs. As further detailed in Chapter Two, many migrant youth especially from rural or conflict affected communities arrive with limited education or market-relevant skills that make getting a job much more challenging. With high expectations for a better life, they can rapidly become disenchanted when they fail to secure safe, productive, well-paying work. Too often, young migrants also face violence and health risks, without access to medical or legal remedy, placing additional economic and social burdens on local governments and communities. Language, ethnic, and/or religious differences, and lack of networks, make migrants more vulnerable to discrimination and acute social isolation. Failure to recognize and address obstacles can incur far larger and longer-lasting costs by leaving young migrants and their offspring in danger of falling into intergenerational poverty, dependency, and failed educational and social integration. Such marginalization and limited protection for their rights embodies a waste of potential and a threat to social cohesion.

In considering youth on the move, it is important to remember the complexity of youth development; employment is but one of many interrelated transitions that a young person experiences. Employment decisions occur alongside those involved in learning for work and life, growing up healthy, marrying and forming a family, and exercising citizenship (World Bank 2007). The nature and welfare consequences of youth migration appear to be distinct from those of other age groups. Migration adds complexity as youth mature into adulthood while changing social and physical environments, leaving behind family and community support. New living environment can be a source of vulnerability, often with less family and social support during a period of life that is already characterized by risk-taking and psychological stress, and greater likelihood of abuse and exploitation (LeGrand et al 2013). This is likely to be particularly true for youth in the lower end of the age spectrum (15-19), who as adolescents may face very different challenges in the migrant experience.

We can better understand complexities and unique challenges in the youth-migration-employment nexus by viewing them as an expansion of traditional youth employment pathways. The ensuing analysis of employment dynamics among youth on the move follows the S4YE’s conceptual framework of youth employment- the Pathway to Youth Employment introduced in the S4YE 2015 Baseline report and shown below. Each step in the pathway can be applied to employment searches in new urban or international markets, in addition communities where youth are born and raised. This report seeks to identify unique constraints migrant youth face at each step in accessing employment in destination markets within or across borders to identify promising solutions to each constraint.

Figure 1: S4YE Conceptual Framework – Youth Employment Pathway



This report takes an exploratory approach to shed light on the youth-migration-employment issues by taking stock of existing empirical literature and findings. The main questions this report are in three main areas. First, it asks – what evidence currently exists to connect youth migration and employment, and what information gaps need to be filled to understand youth migration and employment? Second, how are youth benefitting from migration and what are the risks and constraints particularly relevant to youth on the move? Third, given what we currently do and do not know about young migrants, and about the benefits and vulnerabilities associated with youth on the move, what policies and programs in source and destination markets allow us to maximize the benefits of youth migration while considering socioeconomic realities?

The remainder of this report digs deeper into the unique aspects of the migration-youth-employment nexus. As noted in LeGrand et. al (2013), although the migration literature is abundant, research on the migration of youths in the context of other transitions to adulthood including and particularly, employment has been limited. The dearth of research is due, at least in part, to difficulties in obtaining longitudinal and age disaggregated data that track migration while simultaneously following other transitions. This report will review available, accessible data to identify characteristics of youth migrants, relative to all migrants and young non-migrants; seeks to identify unique challenges and barriers young migrants face in terms of policies and institutions

that influence their employment outcomes. While this review may raise more questions than it answers, the exercise of understanding these barriers will allow us to identify gaps to be addressed in future research and policies.

Our analysis is further informed by primary research comprising twenty-five deep-dive structured interviews and correspondence with key stakeholders; interviewees include young migrants, policy-makers, technical experts, public and private sector donors, and practitioners drawn from the S4YE partnership and the wider youth employment and migration community (see list Appendix B). Core questions relate to young migrant motivations and constraints for young migrants, government challenges and effective or promising policies and practices. Further tailored questions asked about needs, design, impact and lessons, labor market integration, gender, partnerships and technology.

Key Definitions:

S4YE defines *Youth* in its 2015-20 Strategy as individuals aged 15-29. As in other S4YE analyses, usage in this report reflects the variation in statistical and policy parameters across nations and regions, as well as in program design, participation, and evaluation. In this report, the terms “youth” and “young people” are used interchangeably (World Bank, 2007; USAID 2012; S4YE 2015).

Decent Work as defined by the ILO includes opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and provide equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.

Migrants are people driven to leave and reside somewhere other than in their country or community of origin by economic reasons, family reunification, or other reasons not included in the legal definition of a refugee. Data on migrants are mostly taken from national census reports.

- *Internal migrants* are migrants who move from one area (a province, district or municipality) to another within one country.
- *International migrants* are those who relocate from one nation-state to another. In practice, most countries define international migrants as “foreign-born,” but some countries define migrants as citizens of other countries

Refugees are a legal, protected group of people fleeing conflict, violence or persecution across an international border who have had their status confirmed by the United Nations. Asylum seekers are those still in the process of having their refugee status determined.

Internally-displaced persons (IDPs) are people who have been forced to move due to conflict, violence or persecution but who have not crossed international borders.

Irregular migrants or undocumented migrants are those who have entered, or are living in, a country without a proper visa or in violation of laws governing entry and exit of foreigners.

Temporary migrants (also known as guest workers or overseas contract workers) are people who migrate for a limited period of time to take up employment and send money home.

Skilled migrants are those with qualifications as managers, executives, professionals, technicians or similar, who move within the internal labor markets of trans-national corporations and international organizations, or who seek employment through international labor markets for scarce skills.

Low-skilled migrants may include migrants with few formal qualifications, people working in jobs that do not require such qualifications, or people working in low-wage positions regardless of their own educational background.

International Students are those who pursue, at least a part of their education, in a country other than their own.


Sources: S4YE Strategic Plan 2015; World Bank Migration and Development Brief 26; UNESCO COMPAS

1.2 Patterns and Trends

1.2.1 Youth are on the move

Globally, youth represent 21% of the international migrant stock, and 27% of the working age migrant population. The percentage of youth migrants in the global migrant population has decreased slightly from 24.6% in 1990 to 21.1% in 2015. Figure 2 shows that among nearly 250 million international migrants, only around 50 million are youth aged 15-29 years. And while the adult migrant stock has increased from about 100 million in 1990 to about 160 million in 2015, the stock of youth migrants has only increased by about 25 million during the same time-period.


Figure 2: Youth and International Migrant Stock



Source: United Nations DESA (International Migrant Stock by Age and Sex)

In 2015, high-income countries had the largest number of international young migrants. Among World Bank developing regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East and North Africa had the most youth migrants. This finding is consistent with 2015 ILO study findings that, in 2013, 75% of migrant workers were in high-income countries. Moreover, the right-hand side of Figure 3 does not include three high-income regions, namely North America (6.9 million), Western Europe (3.7 million), and Oceania (0.9 million) that host a significant proportion of youth migrants in the international migrant stock in 2015.

Figure 3: International Migrant Stock in 2015 by Income Group and World Bank Regions




Source: UN DESA International Migrant Stock by Age and Sex

Notes: Region abbreviations: EAP=East Asia and Pacific, ECA= Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC= Latin American and the Caribbean, SA=South Asia, SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA= Middle East and North Africa.

Despite relatively low numbers of young people in the international migrant total, net inflows across borders is higher for youth than for adults in the working age population. The propensity to migrate almost universally peaks during young adult ages before gradually declining with age (Bell 2009). Figure 4 shows data of net inflows of working age migrants from 1990 to 2015. Net inflows of young migrants (15-29) is significantly higher in all years, with a peak between 2005-2010 that could be attributed to inflows in the UAE.⁸ Since most people decide to migrate during their youth, it is important to design migration systems in both sending and receiving countries that considers the age of the moving population.

⁸ The UAE, along with other Arab states, have played a significant role in international migration in recent years. A 2015 ILO study shows that over half of all male worldwide migrant domestic were in Arab States in 2013.


Figure 4: Young people represent higher proportion of net migrant inflows



Several reasons explain the apparent discrepancy that youth represent a fraction of international migrant stock, while significantly outnumbering adult migrants in the working-age population (15-64) in terms of net inflows over a five-year period. First, net inflow numbers are relatively small compared to stocks. Second, there is significant repatriation of migrants in the older cohort (aged 45-64) in the adult migrant group; for example, between 1990-2015 it is almost always the case that net inflow among migrants aged 45-64 is negative. Third, inflow of migrants aged 30-45 balances the outflow of older migrants. And finally, people aged 25-29, a cohort with some of the highest net inflows, are categorized as adults and not youth after a five-year-period, therefore increasing the adult migrant stock number.

Among both male and female youth migrants, the highest inflow occurs between the ages of 25-29. Figure 5 shows that from 1990-2015, females represented around 45% and males represented around 55% of net migrant youth inflows respectively. Among youth, net inflows increased with age group. And even though 20-29 year-olds represent close to 80% of net youth migrant inflows, a small but significant proportion of incoming youth are 15-19, have different needs and aspirations compared to older youths.

Figure 5: Net Inflow of Migrants by Age and Gender



Notes: International migrant inflows are author estimates based on Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by age and sex (UN 2015a). For estimation methods see technical appendix section 2

Sensitivity of net migrant inflow based on age cut-off

To understand the apparent contradiction that youth aged 15-29 make up only 21% of the global migrant stock but significantly outnumber working aged adults (30-64) in net inflow numbers, it is also important to consider the prominent effect related to the number of migrants in and around the age of 30. If we run sensitivity scenarios around the definition of youth, we see some interesting outcomes:

- If changing the definition of youth to 15-34 instead of 15-29, we would get significantly different net inflow numbers in 2010-2015. The youth net inflow for age group 15-34 would then be 18.4 million while that for the adults aged 35-64 group would be -700,000.
- If changing the definition of youth to 15-24, instead of 15-29, we would again get a very different youth net inflow of 8 million for age group 15-24 and 9 million for age group 25-64.

Clearly, the numbers in and around the age of 30 makes a significant difference in net inflow calculations. Merely changing youth definition to age category 15-34 would also increase the stock of youth in the total migrant population from 1 in 5 to 1 in 3.

All calculations are based on data from UN DESA (International Migrant Stock by Age and Sex)


1.2.2 Youth are on the move internationally to neighbors or wealthier nations

Between 2010 and 2015, the net inflow of youth was equivalent to 14.8 million migrants while that for adults only totaled 2.9 million. Unsurprisingly, the majority of youth migrant inflows are in high-income countries with better economic and educational opportunities.

Figure 6 shows that among World Bank regions, only Eastern Europe and Central Asia have had similar youth and adult migrant inflows between 2010 and 2015. Incoming youth have significantly outnumbered adults in all other regions, and in Middle East and North Africa, South

Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific regions, the net inflow of adult migrants between 2010 and 2015 is negative, possibly due to repatriation.


Figure 6: Comparison between number of youth and adult migrants by inflows across income groups and regions



Notes: Region abbreviations: EAP=East Asia and Pacific, ECA= Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC= Latin American and the Caribbean, SA=South Asia, SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA= Middle East and North Africa. International net migrant inflows author estimates based on Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Age and Sex (UN 2015a). For estimation methods see section 2 of the technical appendix.

Most cross-border migration still occurs between neighboring countries. While age-disaggregated data is not available, the most active corridors include regions where youth account for as much as a third or more of total population. Figure 7 shows that South Asia to Middle East and North Africa (MENA) represents the most popular migration corridor in the world, with many migrants from South Asia seeking better economic opportunities in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In 2015, 25% of international migrants in GCC countries were youth (15-29). The second and third most popular migration corridors are both within regions (Sub-Saharan Africa and high-income countries in MENA).

Figure 7: International Migration Corridors



Notes: LMICs = Low and middle-income countries, HICs = High income countries. International net migrant flows are author estimates based on *Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin* (UN 2015b). For estimation methods see section 3 of the technical appendix.

1.2.3 Youth are on the move toward cities

While it is important to understand international movements, it is also essential to realize that a significant number of youth migrants still move within rather than across country borders; within countries, youth are on the move towards cities. Because of differing country data collection and record-keeping practices, it is not possible to find aggregate-level information on internal migration. However, the large United Nations research project *Comparing Internal Migration Around the Globe* (IMAGE) aims to fill the cross-country data void on internal migrants (UNESCO 2013). Preliminary estimates suggest that globally about 763 million people live in their country of origin but outside their place of birth (UN, 2013).


Data from select countries show that internal migrants in country capitals are more likely to be youths.⁹ Figure 8, uses census data to show that in select country capitals, the proportion of youth who were migrants was significantly higher than proportion of adult migrants. In some country capitals, such as Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Lilongwe in Malawi, upwards of 30% of the youth were recent migrants.¹⁰ In some cases, the differences between adults and youths were

⁹ It should be noted that while many youth migrate into cities with the objective of educational attainment, additional analysis of the census data (available to the authors) shows that youth migrants attending educational institutions represented the largest portion of the migrants in only one of the 14 countries (as opposed to being economically active or out of the labor force for other reasons). In addition, for only four of the 14 countries the internal migrants in education represented over 20 percent of the youth internal migrants.

¹⁰ Recent migrants were defined as migrants who moved from one administrative area of the country to another within the last 5 years except for Kenya and Zambia (where recent migrants were defined as individuals who moved in the past year) and Iran (where recent migrants were defined as individuals who moved in the last 10 years)

extreme; in Lima, Peru the proportion of youth that recently migrated from somewhere else in Peru was twice that of adults; and in Hanoi, Vietnam about 18% of youth were migrants compared to 5% adults. These numbers refer to recent migrants and thus may be more akin to flows rather than internal migrant stocks.

Figure 8: Proportion of adult and youth migrants in select country capitals




Notes: Only includes urban populations except for countries with asterisks.

Data source: National censuses (see Appendix for more information).

Absent complete data, Figure 9 overlays urbanization and age demographics showing the change in urban population from 2010 to 2015 relative to a country's youth population in 2010. Countries with a larger share of youth population in 2010 have had more rapid share urban population growth between 2010 and 2015 ($R\text{-squared} = 0.17$). As discussed below, urbanization is often motivated by anticipated improvements in long-term welfare, most commonly in the form of improved work opportunities, better access to education or technical training, or improved services. In low income countries urbanization can also be a catalyst for structural transformation, as youth leave rural areas with mainly agricultural employment opportunities and move into urban areas where non-agricultural work, often in the service sector, may be a viable option. Anecdotal country studies also indicate that international migrants are more likely to land or settle in cities (Baird et al 2008; Chiswick and Miller 2004).

Figure 9: Change in urbanization (2010-2015) with respect to youth population (2010)



Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators


1.2.4 Youth are being displaced by violence and conflict

As discussed in section 1.3 below, crime and violence are an important driver of migration; about 10% of migrants enter a new country seeking refuge from violence and war. According to UNHCR, around 21.3 million people (just under 10% of all global migrants) were forced to live outside their home country in 2015.¹¹ Many countries with the greatest relative outflows of migrants shown in Figure 10 suffered most from conflict, and many of these countries tend to have a young population. For example, more than 50% of the total population in Syria (64.5%), El Salvador (55.4%), Central African Republic (68.2%), and Somalia (73.6%) are children and youth below the age of 30.

¹¹ Having said that, it is also important to realize that over two-thirds of people who are displaced from their homes still reside within their country and not outside of it.

Figure 10: Countries with greatest relative outflows of migrants (2010-15)

Net Outflows 2010-2015 as percent of 2010 population




Note: Population data from WDI (2016). International migrant flows author estimates based on Trends in International migrant

Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (UN 2015b). For estimation methods see section 3 of technical appendix.

More than 50% of asylum-seekers in Europe in 2015 were aged between 18-34. Figure 11 shows that a further 10% were between 14 and 17 years old. While age-disaggregated data on refugees worldwide is not available, we can extrapolate from the recent wave of asylum seekers in Europe that a significant number of refugees worldwide are young.

Figure 11: Distribution of asylum seekers in Europe in 2015



1.2.5 Young migrants display varying educational and work patterns

Recent worldwide data on employment and educational status of youth migrants are not available. However, census data from select destination countries in the years 1999-2001 helps us understand a few patterns that may still be relevant today – that most youth are either working or in education in destination countries – and this varies according to context. In select countries, a significant proportion of youth migrant aged 18-24 were working. Table 2 shows that the proportion of youth attending school or working varied by gender and destination countries. For example, 22% of males and 27% of females aged 18-24 in the United States were attending school, while 65% of males and 37% of females were working. The percentage of youth attending school in low and middle-income countries such as Argentina, Cote d'Ivoire, and Costa Rica was significantly less compared to the United Kingdom or the United States. In some countries, percentage of youth not working or attending school was significantly higher, especially among females. 45% of females aged 18-24 in Argentina, 50% in Costa Rica, 60% in Cote d'Ivoire, 43% in Mexico, 47% in South Africa, and 46% in the United States, were neither in school nor working. When looking at these numbers, it is also important to consider that the situation could have shifted in the past fifteen years.

Table 2: Proportion of recently arrived youth migrants working, attending school, or neither, by age

| | | Attending School | | | Working | | | Not in School or Working | | |
|----------------|---------|------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--------------------------|----------|----------|
| | | 12 to 14 | 15 to 17 | 18 to 24 | 12 to 14 | 15 to 17 | 18 to 24 | 12 to 14 | 15 to 17 | 18 to 24 |
| Argentina | Males | 0.89 | 0.57 | 0.13 | n.a. | 0.21 | 0.56 | n.a. | 0.28 | 0.34 |
| | Females | 0.83 | 0.49 | 0.11 | n.a. | 0.19 | 0.48 | n.a. | 0.37 | 0.45 |
| Canada | Males | 1.00 | 0.84 | 0.58 | n.a. | 0.18 | 0.55 | n.a. | 0.12 | 0.13 |
| | Females | 1.00 | 0.87 | 0.52 | n.a. | 0.16 | 0.43 | n.a. | 0.11 | 0.23 |
| Costa Rica | Males | 0.59 | 0.23 | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.61 | 0.81 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.14 |
| | Females | 0.55 | 0.24 | 0.14 | 0.06 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.58 | 0.50 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Males | s.s. | 0.14 | 0.02 | s.s. | 0.46 | 0.87 | s.s. | 0.46 | 0.11 |
| | Females | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.42 | 0.61 | 0.60 |
| Greece | Males | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 0.00 | 0.47 | 0.79 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| | Females | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 0.00 | 0.12 | 0.34 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Kenya | Males | 0.68 | 0.45 | 0.18 | 0.35 | 0.44 | 0.61 | 0.21 | 0.24 | 0.27 |
| | Females | 0.72 | 0.38 | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.53 | 0.17 | 0.38 | 0.36 |
| Mexico | Males | 0.65 | 0.52 | 0.41 | 0.12 | 0.35 | 0.49 | 0.24 | 0.15 | 0.14 |
| | Females | 0.67 | 0.37 | 0.28 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.43 | 0.43 |
| Portugal | Males | 0.97 | 0.67 | 0.14 | n.a. | 0.26 | 0.80 | n.a. | 0.10 | 0.09 |
| | Females | 0.93 | 0.76 | 0.19 | n.a. | 0.18 | 0.58 | n.a. | 0.09 | 0.27 |
| South Africa | Males | 0.83 | 0.53 | 0.28 | 0.08 | 0.22 | 0.46 | 0.10 | 0.27 | 0.29 |
| | Females | 0.92 | 0.68 | 0.37 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.18 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0.47 |
| Spain | Males | 0.95 | 0.65 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.68 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 0.23 |
| | Females | 0.97 | 0.66 | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 0.52 | 0.03 | 0.23 | 0.36 |
| United Kingdom | Males | 1.00 | 0.76 | 0.58 | n.a. | 0.22 | 0.42 | n.a. | 0.09 | 0.08 |
| | Females | 1.00 | 0.69 | 0.48 | n.a. | 0.26 | 0.42 | n.a. | 0.11 | 0.18 |
| United States | Males | 0.90 | 0.56 | 0.22 | n.a. | 0.40 | 0.65 | n.a. | 0.19 | 0.23 |
| | Females | 0.92 | 0.71 | 0.27 | n.a. | 0.19 | 0.37 | n.a. | 0.24 | 0.46 |

Notes:

See data appendix for definition of recent migrant

School attendance only asked for those 15 and over in Canada, so presumed at 100% for those under 15.

Data for UK is for groupings 12 to 14, 15 to 19, and 20 to 24 due to SARS age groupings.

n.a. denotes not asked for this age group.

s.s. denotes small sample.

Source: David McKenzie (2007), A Profile of the World's Young Developing Country Migrants


OECD country data shows that among international youth migrants aged 15-24, unemployment is especially high for African migrants. In 2010/11, the overall unemployment

rate for migrants aged 15-24 from African countries in OECD countries was 37%.¹² Moreover, half of active young emigrants from countries such as Morocco, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Senegal, Chad and the Republic of Congo face unemployment. Unemployment rates were relatively lower for young migrants from Asian and Latin American and Caribbean countries, at 17% and 19% respectively.

A small proportion of young international migrants are international students, and there is a potential link to youths' migration to cities for educational reasons; discussed in section 1.3 below, educational opportunity as a driver is likely increasing. According to UNESCO around 4.1 million students were pursuing tertiary education abroad in 2013. China (712,157), India (181,872) and Germany (119,123) were the three most popular countries of origin sending students abroad for tertiary education, combining to total of more than 1 million youths studying abroad. United States, United Kingdom, and Australia are the three most popular destination countries for international students pursuing tertiary education.¹³

Data shows that in cities, the difference in average educational achievement between youth migrants and non-migrants is small. Figure 12 shows that in select country capitals, the proportion of youth migrants who had completed high school was the same as that for non-migrants.

Figure 12: Educational achievement among migrants and non-migrants in select countries



Note: Sample of 20-29 year-olds for comparability purposes. Only includes urban populations except for countries with asterisks.

Data source: National censuses (see Appendix for more information).

Most economically active internal youth migrants are likely to be wage/salary workers. Figure 13 shows that the proportion of internal youth migrants employed as wage workers is higher than those who are self-employed in select countries, with the exception of Mali. World Bank data shows that for most of these countries youth migrants have lower levels of self-employment than average self-employment rates nationally¹⁴; this is not surprising given the data covers only recent

¹² <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/WP160.pdf>


¹³ <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx>

¹⁴ World Bank. Self-employed, total (% of total employed). Accessed at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.EMP.SELF.ZS>

migrants who likely do not have the resources or networks to establish self-employment options, but may be able to do so after working for a certain number of years as wage workers. Another reason could be that internal youth-migrants do not want to work in self-employment and that is why they migrate. Also, another interpretation could be that only those with wage employment

have the resources to migrate, as studies have demonstrated that self-employment by youth, especially in lower income countries, is often the least preferred employment option.¹⁵ Finally, it is worth noting that this comparison does not speak to quality of employment and often migrants endure lower wages or lower social protections than local workers.

Figure 13: Comparison of employment types among youth migrants in select countries



Note: Sample of 20-29 year-olds for comparability purposes. Only includes urban populations except for countries with asterisks.

Data source: National censuses (see Appendix for more information)

¹⁵ See for example ILO Global Employment Trends for Youth 2012, 2013.

Key Insights:


- While youth represent only 20% of international migrant stock, data from 2010-2015 shows that youth outnumber adult migrants in terms of net inflows by a factor of six. Youth likely have different needs and patterns while integrating into destination markets and migration systems in sending and receiving markets need to keep pace.
- Despite the many reports related to “youth”, “migration”, and “employment”, very little is actually known about the youth – migration – employment nexus. Better data is needed to understand how many youths are employed in destination markets, what is the quality of those jobs, what sectors they engage in, and what skills and education they have.
- While it is important to understand youth emigrant trends and patterns, most youth move within rather than across borders. Data for internal youth migrants, while better than for international youth migrants, still doesn’t fill information gaps to address key challenges related to internal youth mobility.
- Internal youth migrants; on the move towards cities and are contribute to the growing rate of urbanization, especially in developing countries.

1.3 Drivers of Youth Migration

Drivers of youth migration are varied and complex. Most young migrants move for a variety of reasons, making it difficult to determine the primary motivating factor. We can identify and classify common drivers as “push, pull” and as countervailing factors of both necessity and opportunity - that often feed the decision to migrate. Migration choices are largely determined by push factors in the district, region or country of origin including poverty, unemployment, underemployment, decent work deficits, landlessness, rapid population growth, political repression, low social status, and poor marriage prospects. Pull factors meanwhile operate from the place or country of destination, including factors such as better income and job prospects, better education and welfare systems, good environmental and living conditions, political freedom. There are also intervening factors that affect migration choices such as physical distance, cost of making the journey, cultural barriers and language barriers and political obstacles such as international borders and immigration restrictions (Lee 1966). At the same time, rising incomes per capita may constitute a positive driver of migration as resources become more abundant and aspirations rise together with incomes. (Flahaux and De Haas 2016) These factors are largely the same for internal, regional, and international migration, although the costs of moving associated with internal migration (as well as the legal barriers) may be significantly lower.

Youth are more willing to migrate irrespective of the region they are in. According to the latest Gallup Poll, there are more than 1 billion people globally who want to migrate permanently to another country. Figure 14 shows that this desire to migrate permanently is higher among youth than among adults universally. Youth express the highest desire to move in Sub-Saharan Africa (44%), Latin America and Caribbean (40%), and East, Central, and Southeast Europe (37%).

Figure 14: Desire to move permanently, by region and age



Source: Gallup, 2016 “If you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country”

Stakeholder Observations: Compared to older people on the move, young migrants generally are:

- More motivated by self-esteem; young people are very concerned about keeping up with what others have and experience.
- More affected by the “pull from diaspora...more susceptible to peer pressure”.
- More exposed to other cultures and other ways of living.
- Feeling a growing sense of injustice of standard of living compared with neighboring countries.
- Less tied to home.
- More willing to take risks; freer to explore other opportunities, have fewer responsibilities.
- More motivated and flexible to learn new skills and have lower opportunity cost of investing in education and training; older migrants are willing to relocate but less likely to switch occupation.
- More proficient with information and communication technologies (ICT).
- Often more educated, and thus with higher expectations; but suffer from greater labor market constraints.

Source: As noted on page 6, twenty-five key informant and stakeholder interviews conducted over July 8-August 2, 2016. The comments here represent the principal and recurring responses to questions “What do you see as the main factors motivating young people to move to a new community in their own country or to a new country? How is this distinct for young people compared to older migrants?” See Appendix B for complete list of interviewees.

Some of the main drivers of youth migration, both internally and internationally are:

Lack of adequate or quality jobs. As noted earlier, the employment situation and outlook for youth is generally grim, and is a likely an important factor in young people’s decision to migrate in search of more or better employment opportunities (for rural youth, off the farm). As reported (S4YE 2015), youth unemployment worldwide remains near record levels, and hundreds of millions of youth are underemployed or in low quality, low pay or vulnerable work.


Moreover, wage differentials create a powerful incentive to migrate for economic reasons. Clemens, Pritchett, and Montenegro estimate that for observably identical workers in developing countries, the average wage gap with the US is 15,400 per year¹⁶. International wage differentials measured in the study range from 6-15 times higher income in the US compared with country of birth.¹⁷ Figure 13 shows average wages gained (average wage differential times total migrant stock) by migrants moving from select countries of origin to OECD countries and compares to

¹⁶ Clemens, Pritchett, and Montenegro 2008 estimate that the median wage gap, based on a sample of 42 developing countries compared to the US.

¹⁷ Clemens Pritchett and Montenegro

total remittances or total foreign aid for illustrative purposes. While it is important to acknowledge that remittances and foreign aid are mostly spent in countries of origin with lower prices compared to where migrants earn wages, the large volume of remittances shown in Figure 15 serves as a powerful reminder that wage differentials are one of the primary drivers of migration even before migrants can send remittances back home.

Figure 15: Wage differentials in comparison to remittances and foreign aid



Source: Samik Adhikari and Nicholas Stelitano. Data Reference: World Bank 2010, IAB 2000, AidData 2010

Youth also migrate to diversify income and reduce risk. This may be particularly true for developing countries with low savings rates and/or poor safety nets, where economic shocks such as crop failures or sudden unemployment cannot be easily absorbed. Families may then seek to mitigate risks by diversifying family income geographically as well as by sector. Family choice models may be particularly applicable to youth because they often serve as intergenerational “hinges”, and their decisions are often affected by implications for the broader household. Similarly, conditions of young people’s family members who remain in origin country or area may affect migrated youth. In Mexico for example, Tucker et al (2013) found that parents made the decision to migrate for a third of migrant youths rather than by the migrant youth him/herself. The remaining two-thirds of migrant youth made the decision to migrate on their own or in conjunction with pare. In either case, many youth may be expected to remit money out of their likely low wage, impeding their ability to integrate into new countries.

Juxtaposed age demographic patterns between sending and receiving areas is a likely driver of youth migration. Countries such as Japan and Korea, for example, have historically low immigration rates and rapidly aging populations, as a consequence of which the workforce is expected to shrink.¹⁸ Japan has tried to address this by opening doors to more foreign workers, especially in sectors like age-care, where evidence suggests that youth have a key role to play. Although still small, the number of foreign workers has doubled in Japan in the last eight years.¹⁹ In sending countries such as the Philippines, despite high outward flows overall, the youth

¹⁸ <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23133/9781464804694.pdf>

¹⁹ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-25/a-wary-japan-quietly-opens-its-back-door-for-foreign-workers>

emigration rate is relatively low.²⁰ Even among internal migrants, youth are filling the void in ageing societies. For example, China has experienced mass internal migration of young rural workers to higher productivity work in urban areas.²¹ All of this evidence points to the likelihood that demographic age differences between developing and developed countries will be a significant driver of youth migration.

Linked to economic and employment outcomes, pursuing education abroad and in urban areas is gaining prominence as a driver of youth migration. Education can also be a means of legal migration, sometimes easing access to foreign labor markets. Table 3 shows that the number of students enrolled in tertiary education abroad increase 78%, from 2 million in 2000 to 3.6 million in 2010. The United States of America was the most popular destination for foreign students, accounting for 19% of world total, while China, India, and Germany were the top sources of international students (UNESCO 2013). While the “Global North” remains the largest recipients of foreign students, the share going to the “Global South” has increased significantly in recent years. Educational migration is likely to continue and possibly intensify as the growing youth-aged demographic in emerging countries is more likely to undertake tertiary education. While this could benefit origin countries if youth with higher education return, but it may also call for improving tertiary education quality to avoid permanent youth migration.

Table 3: Foreign students enrolled in tertiary education by destination region (1999 and 2008)

| | <i>Number of Foreign Students (thousands)</i> | | <i>Percentage</i> | |
|--|---|------|-------------------|------|
| | 1999 | 2008 | 1999 | 2008 |
| <i>World</i> | 1635 | 2849 | 100 | 100 |
| <i>Developed Countries</i> | 1506 | 2406 | 92 | 84 |
| <i>Developing Countries</i> | 130 | 443 | 8 | 16 |
| <i>Africa</i> | 48 | 79 | 3 | 3 |
| <i>Asia</i> | 128 | 437 | 8 | 15 |
| <i>Latin America and the Caribbean</i> | 10 | 47 | 1 | 2 |
| <i>North America</i> | 484 | 624 | 30 | 22 |
| <i>Europe</i> | 840 | 1392 | 51 | 49 |
| <i>Oceania</i> | 124 | 270 | 8 | 9 |

Family reunification is another possible driver of youth migration, although to what extent remains unclear. Little data is available for youth specifically, but admissions of immediate relatives—spouses, children, parents and other relatives—of citizens and migrants with permanent residence status accounted for at least half of all admissions to Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States in 2003. For the US in 2014, 41% of new permanent residents were immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and another 23% entered through a family-sponsored preference (MPI 2016). As of 2006 in the U.S., half the countries of origin for family

²⁰ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS>


²¹ <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23133/9781464804694.pdf>

migrants were in Latin America or the Caribbean, followed closely by Asian countries (MPI 2007). In the E.U., the number of family migrants entering annually appears stable at about 89,000 in 2014 compared to 90,000 in 1991, while family visas declined 57% from a peak in 2007 of 106,477 to 45,900 in 2014 (Migration Observatory 2016).

Within family reunification, marriages play a prominent role in both internal and international migration. International marriages are becoming increasingly common and are presumably driving youth migration. This aligns to the pattern seen earlier showing that migration is most likely when people in their twenties are experiencing key transitions to adulthood, including marriage and family formation. In the United States, spouses of U.S. citizens accounted for 28% of all persons granted permanent resident status in 2009. In Australia and Canada, spouses of citizens or permanent residents accounted for 22% and 20%, respectively, of all immigrants admitted in 2003. Marriage is also a strong driver of internal migration. For example, two thirds, or around 300 million, of all Indian women have migrated to marry (Fulford 2015). This makes marriage migration the largest form of migration in India; across India, three quarters of women older than 21 have left their place of birth, almost all of which migrated to marry (Fulford 2015).

Crime, violence, conflict, and war play a significant role in driving youth migration. While the issue of refugees fleeing war and violence is discussed in previous sections, it is also important to discuss other forms of violence and their potential effects on youth migration. Violence kills more than 1.6 million people each year (Rosenberg et al 2006). In Latin America, the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa, violence is among the main causes of youth deaths (WHO 2014). Worldwide, an estimated 200,000 homicides victims each year are aged 10-29, accounting for 43% of all homicides (WHO 2014). As shown above (Figure 10), crime and conflict-affected countries—which also tend to be young—display some of the highest migrant exit rates. Gang violence also drives migration decisions of youth in countries not experiencing systematic violence such as war or genocide. Gang violence was a major driver in the surge of unaccompanied children and youth arriving in the U.S. from Central America in recent years. In 2015, 39,999 unaccompanied minors and 38,639 family units were apprehended entering the U.S. from Central America; as of July, 2016 these numbers had already reached 31,067 and 37,256 respectively (U.S. Customs and Border Protection). Data for select countries also shows that victims of crime are significantly more likely to consider migration. Figure 16 shows that in Honduras, for example, 28% of non-victims reported intentions to migrate, compared to 56% of people who had been victims of crime more than once within the previous twelve months. Similarly, in El Salvador the percentage intending to migrate rose from 25% in non-victims to 44% in those two had been victims more than once.

Figure 16: Migration propensities by incidences of victimization in Central America



Source: LAPOP, *AmericasBarometer* 2014

Climate change is becoming one of the leading causes of mass migration. It has been estimated that up to 10 million Africans who migrated, or were internally displaced, over the last two decades moved mainly as a result of environmental degradation and desertification (Grégoire G. de Kalbermatten 2008). The Gallup World Poll Survey suggests that 12% of the world's adult population think that they will need to move because of severe environmental problems (similar results were not available for youth).²² Much of climate migration is expected to be internal, as people often move just far enough to avoid the environmental deterioration. For example, Bangladesh has a long history of seasonal migration associated with annual cycles of rain and dry seasons (UNDP 2013). Historically this movement has been to neighboring agricultural localities, but in the last twenty years this movement has expanded to include core urban areas as livelihoods in rural areas have become more insecure. Similar to conflict, most migration driven by climatic factors tends to be within rather than across countries (Beine and Parsons 2015).

²² Findings of the Gallup World Poll Survey (Gallup World Poll: The Many Faces of Global Migration, IOM Migration Research Series, n° 43, 2011) was conducted in 150 countries surveying more than 750,000 adults (typically aged 15 and older).

Migration from rural to urban areas is also associated with youth aspirations and willingness to break away from traditional norms in communities of origin. Most youth hold negative perception about farm life due to limited profit, constrained social mobility, and low status (Leavy and Smith 2010). Similarly, the anonymity young people find in urban communities alleviates social pressures associated with low job status in manual labor or hospitality occupations. Migration frees people from stigmatization, and opens opportunities for jobs they would not consider in their home communities for fear of shame, such as dishwashing.

Key Insights:

- There are multiple and inter-related drivers to youth migration, both internally and internationally, and several “push” and “pull” factors.
- Given the demographic differences between developing and developed regions, and imbalance in employment opportunities, we can expect the number of youth migrants on the move to increase.
- Young people are universally more willing to migrate than adults. However, not all youth expressing a desire to move actually do. Unmet desire for migration can cause youth to attempt perilous journeys or burdensome loans.
- Rather than rigid measures to stem youth migrant flows, both sending and receiving regions need systems and policies that better facilitate youth migration observing human rights and international labor standards, reduce youth vulnerabilities, and address exploitation and rent-seeking that arise because of the vast gains youth migrants perceive.

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF YOUTH MIGRATION

2.1 Introduction

Building on the theories, analysis, and youth migration patterns and trends presented in Chapter One, this chapter explores what we know about the *effects* of youth migration—on their livelihoods and well-being above all, but also on populations and economies in sending and host countries or areas. The large literature on the effects of migration, has mostly not focused on youth. Young people on the move, whether internally or internationally, face specific challenges and have specific needs—and are motivated by unique opportunities—compared with older migrants. Their migration is also likely to affect sending and receiving areas differently than is the case with older migrants.

To help understand these effects, recall from Chapter One how youth migrants differ from older migrants, and how employment patterns for youth on the move differ from the broader youth cohort. As noted, these differences have to do both with the life-stage nature of adolescence and youth, and the differences in migration patterns of younger versus older people. Youth, and especially adolescents, are developing emotionally and gaining understanding of the world around them; a vulnerable period in which they face greater risks and uncertainty while making important life decisions. Most youth remain strongly dependent on parents and family for life guidance, often lacking internal resources to navigate to adult roles. Among those roles, young people are transitioning into the labor market—a pathway which is complex and highly dependent on public and private institutions, family influences, and the operation of labor markets (S4YE 2015, Chapter 1). When young people move to a new environment, these factors change, and the necessary structures of parental and community support may weaken or disappear, adding to the challenges young migrants face.

In Chapter One, we identified several interesting migration patterns: a correlation between migration and age, a propensity for young people to head toward cities and neighboring or higher-income countries, and a variance among young migrants in education or work. As we elaborate below, these youth migration characteristics influence the risks and opportunities they face, along with the governments and societies trying to integrate them.

We outline the risks and opportunities for young people as well as the implications on both the communities they leave and those to which they migrate. This chapter details and explores constraints to employment and labor market integration youth on the move face. The next two chapters of this report outline promising solutions to address these barriers and mitigate negative externalities.

2.2 Opportunities and Challenges for Youth

2.2.1 *Opportunities in migration for youth*

Earnings. As discussed in the previous chapter, many young migrants move in search of better economic opportunity. Extensive research establishes that individuals who migrate for employment reasons experience substantial increases in income. This is the case for international migration to Europe and the U.S. as well as to other regions, for example from South Asia to the Persian Gulf States, or from Thailand to Hong Kong and Taiwan (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009). The benefits are found even when controlling for education and other differences between migrants and those staying behind (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2009; UNDP 2009). Clemens et al find a wide range of estimates of income gains depending on the country of origin, but their conservative estimate for a moderately skilled worker from the median (in terms of per capita income) country of their sample moving to the U.S. is \$10,000 per year (in Purchasing Power Parity-adjusted dollars). This gain is equivalent to roughly twice the average per capita annual income in the developing world. Given the enormous differences in wages between rich and poor countries for similar work—a reflection of significant disequilibria in labor market globally—it is not surprising that relocating should bring substantial income improvement. Further, the research establishes that benefits apply not just to international migration but also to internal rural-to-urban migration. In Bolivia, rural workers with five or fewer years of schooling experienced a more than four-fold increases in earnings after moving to cities (Molina and Yañez 2009).

Little research focuses specifically on youth, and we lack good estimates of their income gains from migration. Young migrants tend to be less skilled, and less experienced, than older migrants. However, income gains to migration are found across the skills and education spectrum, so sizable gains should occur for young as well as for older migrants. There is also the question of advancement in pay and occupation at new locations, and whether lower-skill migrants and youth can move out of low-skill occupations to improve earnings over time. Evidence for the U.S. and E.U. indicates that such upward mobility is quite difficult for low-skilled compared to high-skilled migrants (Anderson 2015; Benton et al. 2014a,b). Therefore, it is also important to consider the nature of the work that youth migrants find and the risks they may face in terms of employment conditions and rights at work.

Other beneficial impacts. For young people who migrate, gains in income are only part of the benefits, and only part of their motivation, as discussed in the previous chapter. For a young person, taking the initiative to move on one's own, whether to an urban center or another country, can bring respect and prestige. Indeed, in some areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, migration is viewed as a rite of passage (UN 2013; Min-Harris 2010). For other youth, migration brings adventure and freedom from parental or community restrictions or confining norms.

“It is very frustrating to know that the standard of living in countries very nearby is much higher” — Ayaz, 24, Iraq

For many—especially young women who migrate for employment reasons—migration is empowering: it removes them from conservative traditional settings while providing income and a measure of independence. For young women, this is perhaps more pronounced in rural-urban migration, and can potentially lead to increased economic activity. Countries in Asia and Latin American have expanded their export capacity due to the migration of primarily young women from rural areas to factory work (Gosh 2009) – e.g. the Maquiladora in Northern Mexico. When interviewed, very few women who migrated to urban centers in Mexico, Ecuador, Mexico,

or Thailand for export related employment expressed a desire to return to their rural homes (UNDP 2009). In addition to greater income and independence, the opportunity to migrate for work can help young women avoid early marriage and childbearing. In countries like Ethiopia, with one of the highest rates of child marriage, female migration is often the only way for a young rural woman to escape forced or early marriage (Min-Harris, 2010). Internal migration was more empowering for Bangladeshi women than international migration. Evidence shows that women who migrated internally to work in factories felt more empowered than those who migrated to London and performed work isolated from their own homes (Kabeer 2000).

As discussed in Chapter One, education is also an important motivating factor and benefit of migration for many youth, who's sending areas—whether a rural village or a capital city in a low-income country—may lack options to continue schooling. Over half of recent migrants to Canada and the U.K. aged 18–24 from developing countries are attending school (McKenzie 2008). Shares of young migrants in education in other countries—including regional migrants to Mexico and South Africa—are smaller but still significant. Hence, an important motivation as well as outcome of youth migration is the building of human capital. Skills also accumulate through employment experience, and this may occur more rapidly than is possible at home. This benefit of migration depends importantly on the nature of the work that young migrants find, and whether there are trajectories for advancement.

2.2.2 Labor Market Challenges to Realizing the Benefits of Migration Among Youth

While potential benefits to migration for young people are substantial, realizing these benefits may be challenging.

Integrating into a labor market - with different regulations, customs and (for international migrants) languages and where connections are few - is not easy for migrants of any age. Such integration takes time. Reflecting this challenge, migrant employment rates are consistently lower than for host or locals in the U.S. and E.U. (Kerr and Kerr 2011; IMF 2015). Further, unemployment rates of young migrants tend to be higher than for older migrants (Global Migration Group 2014).

Key employment constraints faced by youth on the move

- Restrictive legal frameworks for migration
- Labor market regulations and structures
- Irregularity of employment
- Inadequate access to training or certification of skills
- Lack of access to employment services
- Weak networks, inadequate information
- Barriers to entrepreneurship
- Cultural and language barriers and discrimination

Successful employment outcomes for young migrants depend on many factors, ranging from labor market structure and regulation to access to training and other services. While these factors affect all migrants, they often effect younger and older migrants differently. Further, as recognized in the S4YE baseline report the characteristics of young migrants are important determinants of how they fare in their new environments; many of these characteristics increase risks of poor work, skill, and life outcomes for young migrants. Targeted policies for youth are needed to address these.

For me, securing a visa to work formally in a new country - Kenya - was a major challenge. The employer offered no support to the process and were obliged to demonstrate that they could not identify a local for the job. The time given to get the visa was much shorter than the time required in practice - many people miss out on job opportunities by missing the visa deadline.” – (Mariam)

Work status is the most basic measure of labor market integration that researchers use (though often for lack of more detailed data), and can be considered a basic measure of labor market success. However, it does not address at all the universe of work quality issues that may arise, from the level of pay to working conditions, to uncertainty and the potential for exploitation into forced or bonded labor or other abusive practices.

“Tackling youth unemployment should not disregard and weaken the protection to which young workers are entitled. Reflecting the universal strong support to core international labor standards, policies facilitating access to jobs should not lead to discrimination at work. Young workers have the same rights as all other workers” (ILO, 2012).

With the above considerations in mind, obtaining work that pays significantly better than what one could find at home could be interpreted as a criterion for success. Indeed, as discussed above huge disequilibria in pay in the global is perhaps the most important benefit of (and reason for) migration. While decent work among migrant youth, as defined earlier in this report, should be the principal goal, success could also be assessed through a broader lens as direct information and evidence is very often lacking. Few studies are able to look at skill and job trajectories of young migrants over time; indeed, relatively few studies using individual level data focus on youth at all.

Restrictive legal framework for migration. The legal migration regime affects whether and how young migrants – especially temporary and low-skilled - integrate into local economies, and their general well-being. It can represent the first major hurdle on the pathway to employment upon arrival at their new destination. Undocumented or unauthorized migrants may be unable to get hired for certain jobs, and often lack eligibility for job-related benefits such as pensions. Legal status can also affect access to public services such as education, training and health care. Migrants who are refugees, i.e. displaced by conflict, usually face particular problems with respect to their legal status due to lack of documentation among other factors (refugee issues are considered separately below). As noted, migrants who enter a country without legal permission are more likely to work in the informal economy and engage in potentially hazardous occupations.

The migration regime affects outcomes for youth as well older migrants. Since many youth are still continuing their education or need employment-related training, access to such services are crucial. The migration regime is a large determinant of this access; with lack of legal status usually reducing or eliminating eligibility. Free circulation regimes among Regional Economic Communities (RECs)—if effectively implemented--may be particularly beneficial for youth, since young people are relatively more likely to migrate for work to neighboring countries, that is, within a REC.

Much of youth migration is temporary or short-term, or even (especially within RECs) seasonal; the main cohort engaged in such moves are young men without dependents (Zimmerman 2014). Therefore, instituting formal migration regimes of short-term or circular (as opposed to permanent) stays has the potential to benefit young people if they meet international labor standards and include contingencies to protect workers' rights. Temporary migration regimes may serve to open up opportunities for young people with few skills or experience to migrate and increase their incomes; though it is important to note the possible opportunity cost in time spent or missing access to training or building economic experience at home. This can be done by reducing the costs--to host countries and employers in these countries—of hiring lower skilled foreign labor. However, since migrants are not expected to stay, such regimes also decrease incentives for host governments to integrate migrants economically as well as socially, and dis-incentivize employers from providing training to migrants. Typically, temporary migration regimes also specify lower benefits and services, labor standards and rights to migrants (Global Migration Group 2014). Therefore, they tend to reduce youth migrant access to schooling, host-country employer investments in human capital, youth could potentially be at a disadvantage if social services or safety nets are not available.

The prohibitive cost of moving is another early hurdle young people face to internal or international migration in or between low and middle-income countries. For example, migrants from Vietnam and Bangladesh can pay up to four and a half times the average GDP per capita of their respective countries to move to another place for employment.²³ These costs accumulate due to a combination of factors - ranging from visa and airplane fees to commissions payments to middle-men and recruitment agents - in both sending and receiving markets. High migration costs are especially problematic for poor migrants who have most to gain from migrating due to desperate conditions at home. Often, in the absence of formal mechanisms to finance their trips, migrants borrow large sums of money at exorbitant interest rates from informal sources, substantially reducing savings from earnings. As a result, migrants often fall into debt-traps in destination markets increasing their risk of being abused and exploited. This hurdle may be especially borne by refugees and forcibly displaced people who often leave their homes with little or no time to plan, save or safely borrow. They fall prey to fraudulent recruitment such as debt bondage linked to payment or excessive recruitment fees, costs and charges, or deception about the nature and conditions of work can render low-skilled workers extremely vulnerable to exploitation. (ILO 2016)

Not everyone expressing a desire to migrate gets to move. The economic and social costs of migration are high. As discussed in section 1.3, we know that significant numbers of young people are interested to migrate, but available data indicates fewer numbers actually move. This suggests that impediments to migration that creates unmet desire to move for migrants around the world, potentially leading them into making unsafe migration choices such as moving illegally and taking dangerous routes, or taking on loans that push migrants into debt-traps. Creating systems allowing “safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration”²⁴ is important step to minimize the risks to youth on the move.

²³ <https://iloblog.org/2013/02/15/the-balancing-act-of-migration-the-case-of-bangladesh/>

²⁴ Target 10.7, Sustainable Development Goals

Labor market regulations and structure: The interplay between regulation and employment is a subject of ongoing research, and there is a diversity of views on the impacts of labor market regulations on employment or migration. Labor market regulations routinely fall into the following classifications (a) employment contracts, (b) minimum wages, (c) dismissal procedures, and (d) severance pay and unemployment benefits (World Bank 2015). While labor market regulations, such as Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), can reduce the flows into and out of employment, the effects on employment levels (of young people and others) is ambiguous both theoretically and empirically. For example, regulations such as high severance pay may force firms to hire less workers if the firms are financially constrained and risk-averse. But it may also force firms to keep unwanted workers. The overall effect on employment level can go in both direction depending on type of firm and context. Similarly, there is inadequate evidence on the impact of labor market regulations on migration. As noted above, recent migrants in the U.S. and the EU, with varied degrees of labor market regulation, reported lower rates of employment and higher rates of unemployment than host or local workers. However, considerable variation in these outcomes points to specific history of migration in the country as an explanatory factor. Another study in Europe (Peri 2011) found positive employment effect of immigration is much stronger when estimated for countries with low EPL relative to those with high EPL. However, the evidence to generalize the link between such outcomes to labor market regulations is still limited and anecdotal (Benton et al 2014; Münz 2008, Dustmann et al 2011; Kogan 2006; and Anderson 2015).

When access to certain jobs is limited by regulation or market clearing failures, younger migrants may be obliged to enter specific sectors or occupations, or be shunted into irregular or informal employment. Other factors also affect these outcomes, including lower skill levels and language barriers as discussed below. This is especially true for undocumented migrants or those with irregular migration and pending asylum status, which usually forecloses the possibility of a good quality job. Occupations young migrants enter are generally lower skilled and pay less than those of host or locals, even controlling for differences in migrant education compared to host or locals; and young migrants typically have fewer options for skill accumulation and career mobility (Benton et al 2014a; Münz 2008). In the E.U., occupations held by non-EU migrants differ from those of host populations and this gap has been linked to strict employment protection legislations (Dustmann et al 2011). However, the gap in employment probabilities of non-EU migrants vis-à-vis the host or local population has been larger with weaker regulations, which reiterates the assertion that the impact of labor market regulations on migration can vary.

Immigrants tend to be found in manufacturing, construction and tourism, and unless they are naturalized, lack access to public sector jobs. In the US, for instance, where much of the immigration is from Mexico and Central America, immigrants from these countries are heavily concentrated in manufacturing, construction, and accommodation and food services industries (Münz 2008). In Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, the occupational profile of migrant labor differs sharply from that of nationals, with most migrants working in blue-collar or manual work occupations such as construction, with a few working in the education and health sectors (de Bel Air 2014).

Challenges for refugees and migrants displaced by war may be more acute in the absence of legal or residency status and rights to work or in the presence of wide information gaps or market

clearing failures. For example, there is a designated work permit available for Syrian refugees in Turkey to enable them to access the labor market formally, but “it is not well known by employers or by refugees” so most Syrians work informally in sectors such as animal husbandry, construction and textiles with no benefits, pay below minimum wage, no social protection or rights and unsafe working conditions.²⁵

The more educated among new arrivals, even if they start from such beginnings, have a better chance to move into middle-skill jobs over time and to approach occupational status and wage levels of similarly skilled hosts or locals (Bauer and Zimmermann 1999; Toussaint-Comean 2006; Benton et al 2014a). A comparison of wages among migrants and host workers in high income destination countries suggests that strict labor market regulations extend the wage gap for a longer period after arrival, alluding to the limited movement of working migrants in such environments (Anderson 2015).

Limited research on young migrants suggests that youth, just like older migrants, tend to enter a narrow range of low-skilled occupations in receiving economies. Data from 2008 (Table 2) showed that international youth migrants tend to be concentrated in a few occupations—and in fact, more so than older migrants (Mckenzie, 2008). Young men mainly work in construction and agriculture, while young women often work in domestic services, sales, or restaurants. As with migrants in general, these occupations tend to provide little opportunity for youth migrants to develop skills and move up into better, medium-skill work. As noted, limitations to advancement for young people are of particular concern since they are at the beginning of their working lives. Yet, income benefits for young (as with older) migrants—the static improvement from moving—may nonetheless be sizable when their pay is compared to options back home.

While the foregoing discussion has focused on international migration, it should be stressed that employment and occupation disparities between migrants and host or locals is by no means limited to international migration. Internal migrants to cities often find themselves locked out of the formal economy, and end up working in the informal economy. There are, further, distinct occupation segmentations within the urban informal economy, with rural-urban migrants typically found in more strenuous or dangerous work, such as construction and mining in India (UNDP 2009).

Inadequate access to training and certification of skills: For many youth migrants, the lack of skills and labor market connections (relative to older migrants) likely increases the chances of informal or irregular employment. Often the migration regime itself is tied directly to skills, via two-tiered systems as described above. This, combined with the lack of relevance of the skills they do have for local needs contributes to their placement in the lower end of the occupation spectrum (though other factors such as labor market and legal restrictions, and language and cultural differences, also play a role). The lack of appropriate skills applies both to young international migrants and those arriving to cities of developing countries from rural areas, whose rural schooling and agricultural experience may leave them unprepared for work in urban settings (S4YE 2015).

Among international migrants, even if possessing relevant skills, young migrants often are not able to credibly signal these skills to potential employers because credentials obtained in

²⁵ Interview with Basak Saral, General Coordinator, Habitat, Turkey. August 2, 2016.

the home country are not officially recognized in the destination country. This leads to longer unemployment and skill downgrading whereby individuals accept jobs below their level of qualifications (UN 2013). In turn, underutilized skills may erode. This is an information problem: local employers are understandably uncertain of the value of credentials obtained in other countries. Policy responses as discussed in Chapter Three include mutual recognitions agreements between countries; or, as in Australia, prior vetting of migrant credentials and skills learned on-the-job before they move.

For many low-skill, migrant youth, the issue is not obtaining certification for existing skills but rather getting training and work experience to acquire further or upgrade skills. Even those with substantial education and training often require additional training, for several reasons: Origin country training and education systems are often lower quality than in the host country; there may be gaps in training they received relative to host country expectations; or they lack specific knowledge essential to working in the host country (e.g., technical standards and regulations).

However, young migrants face barriers to accessing training. Partly this is because migrants—especially undocumented or temporary—are often not legally eligible for public training programs or for Public Employment Services that often serve as a gateway to training. Further, training systems are often not well designed for the needs of migrants, which are more complex than those of host or locals. For example, in addition to vocational skills, migrants often need language training. Most countries require proficiency in the local language to be eligible for training, thus delaying access (Benton et al. 2014). As we discuss in Chapter Three, programs that combine vocational and language training can speed the process, with promising approaches focusing on work-focused language training (McHugh and Challinor 2011). Studies and surveys on the youth skills gap also reveal that youth do not necessarily have adequate, and increasingly in-demand, “soft skills” (S4YE 2015). Migrant youth often must overcome cultural differences in work and social interactions to attain these relevant soft skills. Finally, as noted, migrants who already have substantial education and skills may need additional training in specific areas, and these needs will be case-specific.

The factors outlined above imply the need for careful screening of individual training needs of new arrivals, recognizing that young migrants have different and more complex needs than older migrants. Authorities must design programs that meet these needs, but few countries have systems that do this effectively. We discuss promising programmatic responses in detail in the next chapter.

Irregularity of employment. As noted, **Young low-skill, temporary and undocumented migrants may be disproportionately affected by decent work deficits and exposed to irregular employment, characterized by precariousness, uncertainty and job insecurity.** International youth migrants who are undocumented, pending legal refugee protection, unskilled or unable to certify their skills may be confined to irregular employment (e.g. own-account work, casual paid employment or temporary jobs). While there is limited systematic data on the extent of irregular employment among young migrants, youth labor market and household survey information can shed light on their vulnerabilities. For example, about 80% of female youth are in precarious work across South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa (S4YE 2015), and one could expect this to be so for migrant as well. While these barriers apply to all migrants, young people who are

newcomers to the labor market, lacking experience and connections, are more likely to find that irregular employment is their only option.

The issue of precarious employment applies equally if not more so to internal rural-urban youth migrants within developing countries. While youth that enter urban areas often experience income gains, they may also face long term unemployment rates higher than the areas they left behind (Jentsch, 2006; Min-Harris, 2010). Internal young migrants heading to cities in the developing world face many constraints to obtaining livelihoods, including lack of education, appropriate skills, and credit and services to support entrepreneurship (S4YE 2015). Further, work in the informal economy is often the only option for new arrivals to urban labor markets. Indeed, in Africa, two of every three urban residents earn their livelihood through informal wage or self-employment, and the share of such work is expected to increase (Grant 2012). Given its extent and dominance, it is important to improve the labor conditions and productivity of youth in the informal economy, while also supporting their transition to formalization and decent work. In crowded urban centers in Africa and other developing regions, a large share of informally employed youth are engaged in very low paid, irregular work as casual laborers, messengers, and the like.

For youth migrants, whether internal or international, precariousness is also associated with low pay, lack of government oversight and lack of labor rights. In a commonly used terminology, many of these jobs are ‘3-D’--dirty, dangerous and degrading (Global Migration Group 2014). Youth, lacking guidance from parents or older relatives in their new environments, are likely to have fewer internal resources than older workers to avoid exploitation and risk or to assert their rights.

Young women are often especially at risk and face gender-related challenges Young women migrants increasingly work in diverse sectors: manufacturing in China, construction in India, or nursing and home care globally, where they are likely to face gender-related constraints present in the workplace at large. This includes lower wages for similar work, or lack of childcare. A large share of unskilled or undocumented women migrants work as domestic helpers. These “domestics” often work and live in their employers’ homes, where they may be invisible to authorities and become subject to low pay, restrictions on freedom, and sexual exploitation (Min-Harris 2013; van Blerk, 2008; ILO, 2013). Other young women may resort to sex work to survive (Grant 2012).

“The whole process of migration is gendered” - GIZ

Opportunities for irregularly employed youth to acquire skills—or to apply the skills they have—are often limited. Employers have little incentive to train casual workers engaged for just a short time, and this type of work provides little or no room for promotion and social mobility. For young, international migrants with substantial education or training gained back home, absence of certification systems often keeps them from entering fields for which they are qualified. Another barrier is lack of local language skills, which can easily prevent them from working in the field for which they have trained. Too often, they must take marginal work below their qualifications, which can result in deskilling or “brain waste” that endangers future prospects.

At the same time, unskilled or informal work is not always a dead end for young migrants. As noted above, migrants, like non-migrants, with better education may transition from low to middle-skill work. Unfortunately, as noted in Chapter One, the paucity of reliable data on youth migrants prevents understanding these dynamics well enough to develop appropriate policies. Few labor surveys adequately capture the positions of young migrants, and data on irregular work tends not to be disaggregated by age (Global Migration Group 2014). More systematic information is needed on the types of work and working conditions young migrants experience, and on how these jobs condition future employment and pay.

Lack of access to employment services. In most countries, Public Employment Services (PES) provide matching services linking job seekers to employers, as well as providing career counseling and serving as gateways to job training. While these services, together with those of private providers, are much more developed in industrialized countries than in developing ones, they account for a minority of jobs filled, and tend to focus on low-skill jobs (Kudo 2012). Still, they can be a vital pathway to work for young people, especially new labor force entrants with little understanding of how to navigate the labor market, who benefit from counseling and skills development. For migrants, particularly young, low-skill, or temporary, who have far less knowledge of local labor markets than host or locals, employment services can facilitate labor market integration. Further, with greater sophistication using internet and social media, young migrants are usually more comfortable than older ones with increasingly commonplace web-based or text-based job matching services, as we discuss in Chapter Three. However, migrants to developed economies often do not have legal access to PES. In the E.U., new arrivals without legal status, or non-E.U. migrants on temporary residence permits, are not eligible to access employment services (Benton et al 2014). Other barriers include an inability to learn how to register; or lack of language facility, since translation services are rarely included as in PES; and a reluctance of PES offices to take on migrant, whose needs are more complex. Some PES do make systematic efforts to help migrants. For example, Sweden has taken steps to ensure that new arrivals access employment services early upon arrival. Germany's IQ network has begun providing diversity training so staff can better recognize migrants' needs and deal with cultural differences. Such efforts are new and remain uncommon for PES.

For many international migrants, matching to a job occurs before they leave their home country, with jobs arranged through recruitment services in sending countries that contract workers on behalf of employers in destination countries. In principle, these recruiters solve the information problem facing migrants and employers. Certainly, countless migrants have benefited from the services provided by contract recruiters, especially given that in many countries migrants cannot even enter without having first secured work. In the Persian Gulf oil states, enormous numbers of immigrants, many from South Asia, have found temporary work via the *kafala* or "sponsorship" system, which brings in, and monitors, migrant laborers, mostly for construction and domestic sectors. This system has however raised significant violations of labor and human rights and requires strict regulations to protect young migrant workers.

Youth are highly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse under sponsorship systems; and for young women, there are risks of exploitation, sexual abuse, and trafficking (Min-Harris, 2013; van Blerk, 2008; ILO, 2013). Some recruitment services engage in illegal practices such as the confiscation of migratory documents, control by labor brokers, wages far lower than promised,

fake contracts, and forced labor (ILO, 2013). Under the *kafala* system in the Gulf States, a worker's ability to remain in the host country is usually (and legally) completely dependent on the employer or agency's support—a practice that reduces movement and competition, keeps wages below market levels, and most importantly spurs violations of labor rights. While exploitation cases may be more prevalent under temporary schemes, it is important to remember that even high-skilled visa regimes such as the H1-B program in the US may suffer from rent extraction and abuses (Hira 2015).

Analysis for countries such as Malaysia, Cambodia, India, and Pakistan, among others has shown that migrants aged 15-29 years are the most likely to suffer consequences from inefficient or illegal labor matching services; over half of them experienced extended labor hours, work-related accidents, or violations to labor rights (ILO, 2013). However, despite the risks and considerable expense, job seekers of all ages allow themselves to be recruited by intermediaries because they lack the adequate information and networks to find jobs or directly contact potential employers in destination countries (and as noted, often they need to secure employment to obtain a visa). Many migrants use unofficial, unmonitored services that are less expensive services with high risks of abuse. In Ethiopia, for example, of the 60,000 women or so emigrating annually (mostly for domestic work in the Middle East) half of them legally registered in the Ethiopia's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, while the other half used irregular channels such as informal services that are unregulated or monitored by the government (Fernandez, 2013). Although conditions are thought to be similar for both young and adult workers (ILO 2013), sponsorship systems would seem to impose greater risks for younger migrants who, being less sophisticated, are more vulnerable to being misled or exploited.

Weak networks, inadequate information. In labor markets around the world, social and professional networks play an essential role in helping people obtain work, providing labor market information and specific job openings, and supplying critical recommendations. Labor market-clearing information failures are chief constraints for youth employment (S4YE 2015), and particularly effect internal and international migrant youth. Migration networks may be formal or informal, based on family, village, or larger groups. Migration studies from many countries, such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Morocco, and Senegal show that migration is usually a collective effort in which families, social, and religious networks play a crucial role (Cummings et al 2015). For new migrants, social networks at their destination serve this employment function (Granovetter 1995), providing information and assistance that eases their transition to the new environment, including helping access services and housing. Taylor (1986) argues that kinship networks influence household labor decisions by serving as “migration insurance”. Youth face an inherent disadvantage in this respect because their labor market and social networks are not yet well developed, a disadvantage that applies to migrant as well as non-migrant youth. Interestingly, a recent study from the UK found that immigrants are as likely as host or locals to find employment through their social networks (Giulietti et al 2013). This, in addition to lack of skills, can add to the likelihood that young migrants remain unemployed or enter undesirable or precarious employment.

“Young people are drawn to a community where migrants are already living and they can benefit from their experience and learning.” - Ann Miles, Mastercard Foundation

When women move for family reasons rather than employment, migration may not be empowering or may impede finding work. Restrictions on work outside the home in a new country, the demands of raising a family in the absence of a network of relatives to provide childcare, or presence of tight-knit conservative immigrant enclaves, can inhibit young women from working or being autonomous.

Youth migrants are rendered particularly vulnerable with regard to their overall well-being by the loss of informal social networks, relatives, neighbors, and others that would normally look after their welfare. Because they are likely to be more socially isolated or reliant on ethnic, religious, or language minority-based networks, these challenges are particularly acute.

"It is difficult to move without knowing people... It's all about the network you have...(job) opportunities come from people you know... I think the main problem for my best friend who moved to Sweden is that he doesn't know enough people. He's smart, with a good CV, but still cannot find a decent job..." (Ayaz).

"It is not an equal job market" [for immigrants compared with locals] especially young people who lack contacts and networks and especially in countries where personal connections are critical to the job market" - (Saddam).

"Refugees and migrants suffer especially in communities where social capital is very network-based and business is done based on family and community connections." – (IRC)

On the other hand, in one important respect, access to information for younger migrants is easier than for their elders as young migrants are likely to use of new information technology and social media. The "Arab Spring" provides a dramatic example of how social media can help youth connect, obtain information, and share experiences. The ability to stay in close touch with family back home also provides support that eases the adjustment young people must make to their new environments. Within these environments, ICT and social media can be a resource for learning about jobs, housing, and services. ICT may also play an important part in sending remittances home, as discussed below, and combines with social networks to facilitate return migration.

Barriers to entrepreneurship. By necessity or opportunity, internal and international migrants do not just enter wage employment: many become self-employed or entrepreneurs despite numerous obstacles. The S4YE baseline report (2015) showed that older youth cohorts (25-34) are the most entrepreneurial worldwide in terms of nascent start-up activity. Their younger peers (18-24) are also active, but face stronger start-up constraints. The extent to which migrants are excluded from formal wage employment by the migration regime, labor market restrictions or discrimination, or language difficulties appears largely to drive entrepreneurial activity (Jansen et al., 2003; Zhou, 2004 Bruder and Raethke-Doeppner, 2008). Of course, migrant entrepreneurial activity is not restricted to international migrants, as arrivals from rural areas to urban centers across the developing world also find themselves unable to enter formal sectors; one alternative is to establish a small business.

While various labor market barriers may push migrants toward self-employment, they often face barriers there as well. A key constraint among international migrants is the difficulty, relative to host or locals, in obtaining credit. This is likely to be less a result of lender discrimination than of migrants' lack of loan collateral (Naudé, Siegel and Marchand 2015). Migrants also have less knowledge of local markets for goods or services. Often, however, since customers will be in their own ethnic communities, the migrants may have special insights, filling a need caused by that community's lack of access to domestic businesses due to discrimination, distance, or other factor.

Youth migrants seeking to become entrepreneurs face several additional constraints. Relative to adults, young people, whether migrants or not, are disadvantaged accessing business start-up loans as they lack experience in business as well as borrowing histories as assets for collateral to assure lenders (S4YE 2015). Youth are less likely than older adults to have participated in formal banking. Relatively little is known systematically about young migrants', whether internal or international, preferences for starting a business and the barriers they face. Policies to assist them, as we discuss in Chapter Three, would need to encompass training as well as credit provision. These measures would need to be weighed against alternatives involving promotion or preparation for wage employment. However, in many contexts—especially for internal migration to cities with weak formal sectors—there may be few good wage-based alternatives to self-employment for young people (S4YE 2015).

Cultural and language barriers and discrimination. For international migrants especially, cultural and linguistic differences hamper economic and social integration. Lack of familiarity with the local language is one reason well-educated migrants are often work in jobs well below their formal qualifications. Research indicates that young migrants have better employment outcomes the closer they are culturally and/or linguistically to the majority population (Chiswick and Miller 2011, Wanner 1998). Outcomes improve with years of residence in the country (Chiswick 1978, Borjas 2000), indicating that migrants are able at least partially to overcome these, and other, barriers. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, cultural and language barriers also impede access to employment services, training, and other services that could help migrants. In the European Union, recruitment practices comparing young migrants and local cohorts showed that migrants needed four to five the number of applications for positive result such as an interview request, holding all other factors equal.

“Discrimination was the primary factor in recruitment decisions, which led to frustration and exclusion from the labor market... To improve labor market integration there needs to be clear measurement of discrimination.” – Patrick Taran, Lead Author GLOBAL MIGRATION GROUP 2014

Discrimination, and implicit or outright xenophobia and racism, also inhibits access to decent work and integration into the broader society. Though not limited to already economically distressed environments, these sentiments may be more pervasive in communities where poverty or host or local unemployment, especially among youth, is particularly high. As described earlier, immigrants tend to sort into a narrow range of occupations or low-skill sectors. Often immigrants from specific countries or region associate with specific occupations, so employers stereotype certain migrants as being suited for only few limited set of jobs (Constant 2014).

“[There is] growing suspicion” between host and refugee communities, that refugees / migrants are “coming to share in the little resources you have...Unless you offer something valuable to the community, you will always be treated as a guest”. Young migrants who do not/cannot integrate “become candidates for crime” (Saied).

“Turks ask, ‘why should we support the employability of refugees?’”, when unemployment is high (Habitat).

“There is a serious trust issue” between local and host communities, especially as competition for jobs is high. (Saddam)

As a result of these cultural gaps and practices, young migrants can become isolated and excluded. While this is of course a negative outcome for all migrants, is it particularly problematic for emotionally developing youth who are still developing while separated from their families, a crucial protective factor against exclusion and insecurity (Global Migration Group 2014). Faced with economic and social marginalization, young people are particularly prone to respond with negative behaviors such as drug use or violence (World Bank 2013), and young migrants also have limited access to services to help them avoid these behaviors. Further, the migration of women is disparaged in some cultures, with young women not able to travel or move alone, without destroying their reputations and prospects in their home community for them and for their wider family.²⁶

“To be accepted [you need to] prove yourself in a new environment. It is challenging to learn how to “project yourself in business” (Mariam).

“[When I moved] my identity changed. When you are a migrant [in a different country], your identity is changed into what the host country expects. [In the UK] I spoke ‘African’, I ate ‘African’ food, I was ‘African’. When I lived in Kenya, I was distinctly Tanzanian... You are almost putting on a show and this helps to build barriers... This can be equally the case for people who move internally. People from rural villages are less used to the ‘go get’ attitudes in urban areas” (Collins).

Challenges for forcibly displaced and refugee youth

Those driven to move by war and insecurity, both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from one area within a country to another, constitute about one-tenth of all international moves, and about one-twentieth of all internal moves worldwide (UNDP 2009). However, due to recent crises, above all the civil war in Syria, the number of refugees globally is at an all-time high (See Chapter Two). Refugees and IDPs merit special attention because their situation is often both desperate and very challenging for policymakers. Because movement in response to conflict is often sudden and large scale, it can cause significant disruption for host countries or areas. While policy attention focusses first on meeting humanitarian needs of families that often had to flee with no resources, most refugees will remain in their destination areas, or in secondary areas, for years. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure that these migrants, including youth, have access to livelihoods.

²⁶ Interview, Ayaz, youth activist and programs leader, 24, Iraq. July 8, 2016.

In many cases, irregular migrants and displaced persons do not have legal access to the formal labor market, pushing them into the informal market or unemployment. For example, many Syrian refugees of legal working age have not been able to obtain work permits to legally work in Turkey. In some contexts, labor market options of internal, rural-to-urban migrants are also restricted by laws or regulation. The most well-known example of this is China, where for decades the *hukou* residency permit system prevented migrants from accessing formal sector jobs as well as public services in cities (UNDP 2009). As a result, migrants are obliged to accept less desirable work in large informal sectors.

Youth refugees face the same training and employment barriers as other migrant youth, but refugees encounter a number of additional challenges. Dislocation trauma may increase the need for health and psychological services and hinder adjustment into education, training, or work, while also increasing vulnerability to risk behaviors. Given the forced nature of their moves, refugees will often lack access to established social networks in destination areas that would help secure work. Because families often are unable to move with documentation and identity papers, it is more difficult for refugee youth to establish their education or training backgrounds. The lack of identification papers also has broader ramifications, as it often prevents refugees from legally obtaining work as well as various public services (UNDP 2009). Among refugees, young men have restrictions on movement linked to security forces and checkpoints; young women may move more easily through checkpoints, but they face more risks, such as sexual violence.²⁷

Government and international aid policies in host countries impose other refugee constraints. Settling refugees into isolated camps hinders access to labor markets or opportunities for entrepreneurship, though refugees tend to abandon camps and migrate to cities, as has happened in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, where most refugees are now living outside refugee camps (Culbertson 2016). In some countries, refugees are simply not permitted to work or to have free movement (UN, 2011; Aiyar et al., 2016). For Syrians, Lebanon has chosen not to issue work permits for refugees, while Jordan and Turkey have been, or are starting to, relax access to employment for refugees. In studies of refugees in six Africa countries, only Uganda has allowed refugees to legally move freely, to accept work, and to access land (HDR 2009). The negative implications for livelihoods in the other countries are clear. Asylum seekers who have not yet obtained either refugee status or residency, or whose requests have been refused, are in a particularly precarious situation; for them, informal or irregular work is usually the only possibility.

Host governments may feel less willing to assist in training and livelihoods of young refugees compared to other migrants—and certainly less than host or local population—because of costs, the need to prioritize humanitarian assistance, and an expectation that refugees will not stay. However, refugees may stay for many years. Most “protracted” refugee situations, defined as 25,000 or more refugees from a country being in an asylum country for five or more years, stretch out to 20 years or more (UNHCR 2016). Policies are therefore needed to economically integrate refugees, and especially youth refugees. This can be a strong, positive investment that decreases short and long-term fiscal costs while contributing to economic growth (Aiyar et al. 2016; 3RP 2015).

2.3 Opportunities and Challenges in Sending Areas

Migration poses challenges not just for migrants but also for populations and economies in both sending and receiving areas. Both positive and negative externalities have been much researched, but most of this research has not distinguished effects on youth compared to older

²⁷ Interview, Mario Patino, Economic Recovery Coordinator, IRC Lebanon. 12 July 2016.

migrants. Nonetheless, some important conclusions can be drawn from the evidence. Discussions of these effects consider a range of areas, including remittances, loss of skilled workers (i.e., brain waste or conversely brain gain), investment and entrepreneurship, and incentives for investment in education. Many of these areas manifest as both opportunities and challenges depending on volume, context, associated policy, or other factors as discussed below.

Remittances: International remittances from migrants to home countries constitute an enormous transfer of resources from wealthier to poorer nations. Remittances to developing countries are estimated to have reached \$436 billion in 2014 (World Bank 2015), more than three times that of official annual aid flows. Given the magnitude, it is not surprising that many household level studies in developing countries show that remittances play an important role in increasing consumption and reducing poverty in low-income sending countries or regions (Giovanni et al., 2014, Tingsabadh 1989; Gustafsson and Makonnen 1993; Adams 2005). A cross-country study of 71 developing countries, with controls for level of country income and economic growth, found that that a 10 percent increase in per capita official international remittances was associated with a 3.5 percent decline in people living in poverty (Adams & Page 2009). The poverty reduction role of remittances appears to be more significant for internal than international migration, in part because internal migrants tend to be from poorer households than those who are able to make it overseas, so there is greater scope for poverty reduction (UNDP 2009).

Remittances are also linked to increased investments child schooling and health for family members left at home (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Acosta, 2007; Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Mansuri, 2007). For poor households, remittances also play an important insurance function, providing a source of family income that can smooth consumption during difficult times. While remittances appear to mostly supplement household consumption, studies also suggest that remittances also increase savings and investment in assets and small businesses at home (de Haas 2005; Lucas 1987, Adams 2006, Woodruff & Zenteno 2001, Yang 2008). The large inflow of funds to poor areas has also spurred development of formal banking and financial intermediation services important for economic growth (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2005; Gupta et al 2007). Remittances serve as a major source of foreign exchange, facilitating imports; though they also strengthen the exchange rate of the home currency, potentially harming exports, as may have occurred in Latin America (Acosta et al. 2007). Evidence suggests that remittances contribute to economic growth, not just poverty reduction; but the evidence is mixed (see Page and Plaza 2006), with existing research subject to statistical limitations that make it difficult to isolate the effects of remittances from other factors.

Young migrants send remittances, but remit less than older migrants (Global Migration Group 2014). This is partly because youth earn less than older workers, and also because many youth migrate for education rather than work. Youth also have less access to formal banking system, so are more likely to resort to riskier and potentially more expensive informal mechanisms to send money home. These factors significantly reduce the net amounts that make it home to families, and thus also reduce the incentive to remit. In Africa, with the exception of Kenya with a highly developed mobile money system, most young internal migrants send remittances through less reliable informal channels such as couriers, personal delivery, or friends and relatives (GLOBAL MIGRATION GROUP 2014). Recognizing the costs and difficulties associated with remittances, the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals commit (target 10.c) member states to reduce to less than

3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and to eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%.

Relative to older migrants, youth moves are more likely to be temporary, and young migrants typically do not have dependents. These factors should tend to increase the propensity to remit or the share of income remitted. Further, although they may have little access to financial services, young people are better at using information technology, hence have access to innovative means of transmitting earnings. Mobile phone-based banking systems can bring formal banking services to remote populations across the globe: In Kenya, for instance, the spread and success of mobile banking, led by M-PESA, is striking (Demombynes and Thegeya 2012). Young people are more likely to have mobile phones, be receptive to new technologies, and are more likely to use them to efficiently and safely remit earnings (GLOBAL MIGRATION GROUP 2014).

Brain Waste and Brain Gain. Historically, conversations about sending country effects of migration have focused on the “brain-drain” argument, that is, the outflow of high-skilled migrants believed to cause critical skill shortages in low-income source countries. However, recent evidence suggests that most of this concern is misplaced because it does not consider the benefits that migration of high-skilled workers bring to sending areas. For example, in Africa, research (Ozden and Philips 2015) shows that almost half of African born doctors were trained outside their country of birth; but at the same time, roughly 15% of all doctors trained in Africa were born outside the continent. Moreover, many African doctors emigrate only after years of service and their talents are not totally lost by their home countries. This implies that skilled migration accounts for only a small portion of African skill shortages. Further, skilled migration can also lead to “brain gain”, either through increased returns of skill migrants or interactions with them. Clemens and Chand ’08 find that high rates of emigration by tertiary-educated Fiji Islanders not only raised investment in tertiary education in Fiji, they raised the stock of tertiary educated people in Fiji even net of departures. They also found that these effects are dynamic as opposed to static. Clemens (2009) also finds that development is harmed by policies that seek to limit skilled worker’s movement to other countries rather than focusing on modifying the causes for their decisions to leave. Ultimately the greater concern with skilled migration proves to be “brain waste,” or the movement of skilled workers into less-skilled jobs as a result of the previously described mismatches in skill certification and training.

Returning migrants bring skills as well as savings from abroad that would have been difficult or impossible to accumulate at home because of poor work opportunities and undeveloped financial systems. Returning highly skilled migrants in technical fields has added technological dynamism to the economies of China, Taiwan, India and others, with the size of the positive effect related to government policies to encourage and support this movement (Saxenian 2002). The benefits are more general than simply in the high-tech and engineering sectors. Migrants returning home to developing countries earn a wage premium relative to those who never migrated with similar education and years of experience (Wahba 2007; Reinhold and Thom 2013; De Vreyer et al. 2010). Although some of this may reflect migrant selectivity due to differences in ability of migrants and non-migrants not accounted for in the estimates, it likely also captures the better skills that migrants were able to accumulate internationally. Return migrants also appear to have a high propensity to become entrepreneurs, reflecting accumulation of both skills and savings abroad

(Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002; Ilahi 1999; Gubert and Nordman 2008; McCormick and Wahba 2001; Mensard 2004).

Research suggests that return migration, like remittances, can enhance local productivity and growth, depending on whether home countries are conducive to entrepreneurship and productive employment for returnees. Return migrants also bring modernized social norms, either from cities or from abroad, that are potentially socially, politically, and economically transformative—so-called “social remittances” (Levitt 1998).

Given high rates of return migration, and with many years of productive labor ahead of them, youth migrants potentially can contribute substantially to development in their home countries and communities. However, few countries have policies in place to economically integrate young returning migrants to use accumulated skills, ease entry into entrepreneurship, or channel their savings into enterprises (Global Migration Group 2014).

***Effects on local labor markets:* Theoretically, extensive emigration should improve wages or employment rates in sending areas or countries by reducing local labor supply relative to demand.** Evidence from European countries that had experienced large scale emigration, as well as several careful contemporary analyses establish causal links between emigration and improvement in wages and employment in sending areas (see Elsner 2015). Indeed, a number of country-level studies, in Mexico, Honduras, and Canada, for example, demonstrate that emigration increased wages in source countries (Mishra 2007, Gagnon 2012, Borjas 2007, Aydemir and Borjas 2006, Hanson 2007). Through such labor market effects, migration can reduce poverty in sending countries and regions even for families not benefiting directly through remittances.²⁸ Often these effects will be localized in the specific sector or area of a country from which the bulk of the migrants depart; effects beyond that will depend on how well national labor markets are integrated.

Positive effects for workers in sending area labor markets do not always occur. If the economy is well integrated into the global economy, rather than increasing wages and prices for locally produced goods, large scale emigration may increase import substitution for local production (Dayton-Johnson et al. 2009). Eventually, economies adjust to large scale emigration and consequent pressure on wage costs through changes in production techniques; for example, mechanization of agriculture. This will in turn reduce labor demand and stem upward pressure on wages. Further, if emigration consists largely of skilled workers, tightening labor markets is not likely to benefit poor workers or reduce poverty.

In some rural areas in developing countries, youth out-migration may be so large as to harm to local economies. In some communities, so many people have left that agricultural production is significantly constrained (Rubenstein 1992; Tirtosudarmo 2009). While this implies negative effects on sending areas, it has to be weighed against productivity gains in urban destinations and benefits flowing back through remittances. Further, high out-migration is more a symptom than a source of problems in the rural sector. In remote rural areas across the globe, youth have a greater knowledge of life in urban areas and other countries than in the past, and tend to consider agricultural or rural livelihoods unappealing (Leavy and Smith 2010). However, the lack of appeal

²⁸ The consumption impacts of remittances can also have indirect effects on employment and poverty by raising demand for goods and services, as would any investments by return migrants.

also reflects a range of constraints, including low agricultural productivity, lack of access to land and credit, and lack of rural non-farm business opportunities. Policies addressing these rural constraints could increase incentive for young people to remain in rural, agricultural communities (S4YE 2015).

Effects on education and skill accumulation incentives: Migration may also alter returns to investment in human capital in sending economies. In addition to migrants, migration can affect human capital development for young people who do not migrate. We already noted one factor for this: remittances can help families invest in schooling for children still at home. In addition, for older children and youth, broadening possibilities for migration may change incentives for education. If jobs abroad, or in urban centers in one's own country, substantially reward better schooling, many youth or their families will decide to extend schooling to enhance the chance of finding a job in these destinations. Since not all better educated young people leave—and as noted many who do leave will return—it is possible that overall human capital increases at home; benefitting the educated young people themselves as well as the local economy (Vidal 1998; Mountford 1997). The limited rigorous empirical evidence supports this idea (Clemens 2013).

Conversely, migration-related incentives may reduce educational attainment if the jobs young people expect to obtain from migrating are low-skilled; even if they pay well by home standards, so moving remains attractive. In Mexico, easy access to such employment in the U.S. appears to reduce investment in young people's educational attainment (McKenzie and Rapoport 2010). In China, relatively high-paying jobs in urban areas for those with middle school educations discourage rural parents from enrolling children in secondary school; restrictions on rural migrants' access to more skilled urban occupations under the *hukou* system may reinforce this behavior (De Brauw and Giles 2006). Therefore, while the effect of migration on young peoples' human capital accumulation is likely to be positive, incentives may also work in the opposite direction. Overall, migration may remain beneficial in these contexts, but limits to educational and skill attainment will eventually curb economic development. Policymakers need to know if this is happening to develop policies to offset these effects.

Finally, growing evidence implies that international migration followed by returns can strengthen democracy and institutions in home countries; which can create a more favorable investment and business climate. Studies in Mali, Moldova Morocco and Mexico (Hamdouch, Wahba, Tuccio, 2016, Chauvet and Mercier 2014, Pfutze 2012, Mahmoud, Rapoport, Steinmayr, Trebesch 2014) have found emigration and cyclical or return movements can help transfer democratic norms and values, change political attitudes, and increase electoral participation and voter turnout. This can help reform institutional quality and promote higher accountability (Docquier et al 2016, Beine and Sekkat 2013, Testaverde 2013).

2.4 Risks and Opportunities in Destination Communities

Labor market and economic impacts. Amidst concerns over negative aspects of migration, it is important not to lose sight that migration addresses major global or national labor imbalances by reallocating labor to where needed. In Europe and Japan, young workers are needed to compensate for labor shortages emerging from the aging of the domestic workforce. In oil-rich Persian Gulf countries, massive immigration of workers from South Asia and elsewhere

has helped speed economic growth in these resource-rich but labor-poor economies. Increasing the amount of labor in the economy increases aggregate production. And internal migration to cities has helped Asian export-led manufacturing growth. In Shenzhen, China, a ready supply of skilled and semi-skilled young workers, combined with investments in education and research facilities, helped meet the needs of a dynamic electronics industry (World Bank 2009).

Further, young skilled migrants can be a source of innovation and technological dynamism in host countries. Immigrants to the U.S. account for 24% of patents, twice the rate of the general population (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2009). Indeed, many high-income countries try to attract and retain high-skilled migrants, motivating the two-tiered migration regimes discussed above. More generally, the presence of many people from different countries brings social dynamism and cultural richness and diversity to urban centers. This diversity can stimulate innovation in multiple dimensions, both economic (Lazear 2000) and cultural, in areas such as art, music, literature, and cuisine (IOM 2004). Still, as is well known, host or local populations often have significant concerns with migration. The most important and longstanding fear in high-income as well as middle and low-income countries, is that migration leads to higher unemployment, or lower wages, among the host or local workforce. Despite these views, research in the U.S. and E.U. has found that immigration has little or no effect on local employment; in some cases, research has found positive effects on productivity and economic growth (Longhi *et al.* 2005, Peri 2014; Constant 2014).

While counterintuitive that immigration has little negative effect on employment or pay of host or local economies, recall that migrants typically have lower skill levels and enter different occupations than host populations, so the two rarely directly compete. Migrants often fill jobs that local populations do not routinely seek, for instance, in agricultural labor, domestic work, elder care, and low-skill factory work. This pattern is not limited to industrialized countries but also characterizes migration from poor to less poor countries—the predominance of Egyptian labor in Jordan in construction and selected other sectors being one of many examples. By filling roles in sectors or occupations where local labor is in short supply, immigration can expand production in the economy—as it did in Northern Italy in the mid-1990s and Greece in the early 2000s (Constant 2014).

Increased women’s workforce participation can also increase productivity especially when lower-skill, probably young migrant domestic workers increase the ability of higher-skill women to work, especially younger mothers in host countries. For example, female migrants providing low-cost childcare enable host country women to enter or return to work in Hong Kong and Italy (Kremer & Watt 2006, Cortes and Pan 2009, Barone and Mocetti 2010.). Other studies (Cortes and Tessada 2011) found that low-skilled immigration increased average working hours for women at the top group of the wage distribution.

While overall effects on host or local employment and wages are likely positive, there may be small negative effects on the low-skilled host country labor force, though the mixed evidence is a source of research debate (Peri 2014; Murray et al 2006). Conclusion from other studies also find mixed evidence on migration effects on wages in receiving communities and countries. In Britain, Nickell and Saleheen (2015) found that the immigrant-to-host or local ratio has a small downward effect on average British wages, with the largest effects in semi/unskilled service jobs. In their

study, immigration from E.U. countries had no effect on aggregate U.K. wages. In Thailand, immigration raising Thailand's labor force by one percent cut Thai wages by about half of one percent, with no evidence that immigration has reduced Thai employment rates or has affected internal migration. (Bryant and Rukumnuaykit 2012).

Recall that this is the labor market segment where migrant labor is more likely to compete with local workers. However, long-term effects on low-skilled host or local populations can be positive. The concentration of migrants into specific routine jobs may allow host or local workers of similar skills to specialize in tasks that require "location-specific human capital" that migrants do not have, in particular, language and cultural skills. In this way, low-skilled migrant and local labor complement each other. Further, as migrants take over specific low-skill tasks, host or local or local workers upgrade skills and move into higher level jobs, as happened during Germany's economic rise starting in the 1960s (Constant 2014). However, while there is little evidence for host worker displacement, negative effects can be greater for earlier cohorts of immigrants who are likely to be in direct competition with new arrivals (Zorlu and Hartog 2005; Ottavio and Peri 2014).

Research on international migration has focused on industrialized countries. Less is known about South-South migration. To the extent that skill structures are similar in sending and receiving countries compared with migration from low to high-income countries, we might expect more displacement of host or local workers from South-South migration. Detailed analysis of the impacts of Nicaraguan immigration on earnings of Costa Rican host or locals (Gindling 2009) finds evidence of only limited effects, but a similar study in South Africa suggests that immigrants from other African countries displaced skilled local labor (Facchini et al 2013). High levels of *internal* migration may negatively affect the employment situation in receiving urban areas. If urban or national economies are stagnant and lack infrastructure and institutions to absorb new arrivals productively, youth unemployment will increase and/or migrants will enter already crowded informal sectors such as transport and retailing, pressuring wages downward in these segments.

Since a majority of young international migrants may be low-skilled, they are less likely to compete with host or local workers in higher-income, high skill destination countries. Therefore, youth migration may be less likely to effect host population employment or pay compared to migration of older, better skilled workers. Host or local youth in destination countries may, however, suffer negative consequences from migration of younger or older individuals. Like youth elsewhere, host or local youth in the labor market are generally at the low end of the skill spectrum, and most likely to experience negative effects of low-skilled inflows. Few studies have considered this issue, but Smith (2012) finds that immigration reduces U.S. host or local youth employment more than it does host or local adult employment, without inducing greater schooling, suggesting that costs for young people in receiving countries in terms of inhibiting access to work.

Finally, is it important to recognize that even if labor market effects are small, fears over job competition from migrants—combined with social, cultural, or security concerns—is high in many countries, as recent political developments in Europe, including "Brexit", make clear. Where economies are stagnant, or specific groups are losing jobs and incomes, migration looms for many as a plausible cause of the problems experienced. Hostility and discrimination toward migrants in

many countries sometimes lead to pressure for mass expulsions (Ratha et. al. 2011). Avoiding this outcome requires policies to integrate migrants and to deal with public economic and social frustration. Failure to do so leaves migrant youth populations with fewer emotional resources or social supports marginalized and alienated

Fiscal costs. While migrants create positive labor market and economic effects, they also increase variable costs in host areas. Increased immigration stresses government fiscal resources as demands increase on public services such as education, health, housing, income, and employment assistance. Yet, one could argue that migrants' contributions to output and national income more than make up these costs through increased tax revenue. Regardless, government allocations for services may fail to keep pace with increased needs caused by immigration, limiting or impeding quality of services; for instance, through overcrowded schools. This can create further resentment toward migrants.

Net fiscal costs to host economies from migration vary significantly by context. Costs represent the difference between taxes migrants pay and the costs of providing public services they use plus their imputed share of public goods such as defense. Accord to the OECD's *International Migration Outlook* (2013), immigrant's fiscal impact is not more than 0.5% of GDP in either positive or negative terms. Countries experiencing rapid influxes of irregular migrants or refugees, both of whom have few resources and substantial immediate basic needs, often suffer significant fiscal stresses. The burden on public resources created by the huge numbers of Syrian refugees to neighboring countries is a case in point (UNHCR 2016a).

For South-South migration, costs issues may loom larger than in high-income countries since many developing countries already struggle to provide basic services. While research examining costs for different groups of migrants by age is limited, studies (OECD 2013) show that an immigrant's age is a key variant in cross-country differences in immigrant net worth. However, age plays a lesser role compared to other factors; employment largely determines a migrant's net fiscal contribution. Young migrants may impose larger net costs on host governments than older migrants given their greater education and training needs, and lower tax contributions; since many youth migrants do not work or earn less, they pay fewer taxes.

Crime and Insecurity. A great deal of anxiety surrounds the issue of migrant-related crime and security, and this concern focuses largely on young migrant men. Despite widespread concerns that migrants widely involved in criminal activity relative to host or locals, empirical research generally does not support this notion. Areas with larger concentrations of migrants are not found to have elevated rates of violent crime even when country studies control for other differences across areas, although there are possibly small effects on property crime (Bell 2014; Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti 2012; Spenkuch 2011; Mastrobuoni and Pinotti 2011). More salient, studies in the U.S. and Europe find that crime rates elevate to similar levels as host or local populations among immigrant groups with poorer labor market opportunities, and lack of legal status, which, as discussed above, reduces migrant access to good jobs.

In the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S., popular concerns link immigration and violent extremism, again focusing on male youth. While this complex issue is well beyond the scope of this review, we can say that aside from the possibility of "terrorists posing as refugees" entering a

country, the likely danger relates more to radicalization of young people in host countries. Related to migrants, we can trace this problem largely to alienation and lack of integration of youth into host societies and job markets. It argues further for the need to create avenues for young migrants to develop skills and engage in productive lives.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed evidence on the effects of youth migration, beginning with benefits and challenges facing the youth themselves, and then considering effects on both sending and receiving areas. It has emphasized the need to view these effects through a youth lens, which has not been a common approach. Young people on the move face specific challenges and have specific needs compared with older migrants, including greater training needs, lack of job experience, and limited access to employment-related networks, credit, and information. Other differences relate to the kind of migration; young people migrate more often internally or regionally than do older migrants, and less permanently. While some differences relate to the characteristics of youth as a stage of life, when guidance and support is still needed but is often lacking for those who migrate.

However, data and research on migration has rarely distinguished between youth and older migrants, speaking to the need for more research focused specifically on young migrants. Similarly, policies, and programming regarding international migration in both host countries and sending countries—and also in internal countries’ rural-urban migration—have not targeted the special needs and characteristics of youth migrants. Below, we provide promising evidence-based policy and programmatic guidance to help young migrants succeed, expand opportunities for them in origin and destination countries, and mitigate risks they face.

Key Insights

- While youth can benefit from migration, better wages, freedoms, and opportunities, several constraints undermine and limit their finding decent jobs or starting and sustaining a business.
- Opportunities for home communities and countries include reduced unemployment, higher wages, accumulation of skills, skills flows, remittances, and increased political and civic participation; while risks include “brain drain and waste”, and reduced educational attainment if emigration is mostly low-skilled.
- Opportunities for destination communities and receiving countries include addressing shortages of labor, increased labor force participation of women, innovation and technological dynamism, and brain gain; while risks include marginal increases in fiscal costs and lower employment outcomes for low-skilled workers under some scenarios

CHAPTER THREE: TOWARD EMPLOYMENT SOLUTIONS FOR YOUTH ON THE MOVE

3.1 Introduction

Chapter One drew a fact-based picture of the “youth-employment-migration nexus”, while Chapter Two analyzed the evidence and knowledge base about the effects of youth migration, highlighting risks and opportunities for youth as well as for sending and receiving communities and countries. **Chapter Three builds on the previous two chapters to explore employment solutions that address many constraints highlighted in Chapter Two.**

As demonstrated, migrant youth can bring new ideas, skills, products, and innovative services that boost economic and social development in receiving communities. Seizing this opportunity requires breaking down barriers to economic participation by youth on the move. Solution must create opportunities for young migrants to deploy their assets, talents, innovation, and energy to the benefit of their adopted homeland, but solutions also must assuage negative externalities to communities that host them.

In looking at the solutions below, it is important to keep in mind the vast diversity of young migrant experiences. Migrants may face opportunities and risks based on their underlying determinants (as depicted in the S4YE conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 1): whether they move internally or internationally, forcibly or voluntarily, and depending on characteristics of their host society, among other things. These differences may affect both what support and solutions can effectively support them on the path to employment.

Given the variance in migrant experience, as well as our limited knowledge on solutions, we cannot yet prescribe solutions that can be implemented at scale. Rather, the following section provide examples of recent and promising solutions deployed. While many of these solutions are in pilot stages, and have not been formally evaluated, they indicate promising directions for further research and exploration. Further, we note that many of the solutions were designed for adult migrants and have not been tailored to youth; nonetheless, we believe many are applicable to youth migrants.

3.2 Employment solutions for youth on the move

The rest of this chapter draws provides potential avenues for solutions to many constraints described in Chapter Two, based on real-world examples and case studies. While many of the avenues contain youth-specific examples, some address broader legislative, political or societal concerns that are equally relevant for youth as for general migrant population.

The eight constraints listed in Chapter Two are:

- Restrictive legal frameworks for migration
- Labor market rigidities and structure
- Inadequate access to training or certification of skills

- Irregularity of employment
- Lack of access to employment services
- Weak networks, inadequate information
- Barriers to entrepreneurship
- Cultural and language barriers and discrimination

We address the eight constraints through *five* actionable solutions on the basis of real-world examples of interventions seeking to address labor market challenges that young migrants and refugees face. Table 1 matches the five solutions with the eight constraints. It also maps these constraints and solutions to the corresponding steps of the S4YE “Pathway to Youth Employment” presented in Chapter One, as well as mapping solutions to S4YE’s four Frontier Areas in which S4YE seeks to focus its work: i) skills gap, ii) self-employment and entrepreneurship, iii) quality jobs, and iv) digital age impact. Importantly, while there is alignment between highlighted solutions, identified constraints and frontier areas as presented below, this mapping is not exclusive and there is also likely to be overlap and multifaceted programming.

As stated, the solutions showcased here represent an illustrative global sampling. Few have been evaluated rigorously, making it too early to offer directive prescriptions about which ones yield the intended outcomes or can work in differing, broad contexts or be scalable to larger populations. They are meant to guide and inspire work and further experimentation to mitigate or eliminate the constraints that impede the safe and productive employment of young migrants.

Table 4: Matching constraints and solutions for improving migrant youth employment

| Constraints | Solution Sets | S4YE Pathway to Youth Employment | Relevant Frontier Areas |
|---|---|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restrictive legal frameworks for migration • Labor market rigidities and structure | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing legal pathways to move and work for migrants and refugees and protection mechanisms to preserve human and labor rights. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government and non-governmental factors influencing youth employment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality Jobs |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate access to training or skills certification | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving access to destination- and employer-specific training and certification | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training & skills development • Identifying skills gaps, remedial basic skills | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skills gap |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irregularity of employment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reducing information asymmetries, service | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job search and acquisition | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality Jobs; Digital Age Impact |

| | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of access to employment services • Weak networks, inadequate information | provision through digital platforms | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barriers to entrepreneurship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reducing financial and experiential barriers to entrepreneurship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enterprise development • Business growth and expansion | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-Employment & Entrepreneurship |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural and language barriers and discrimination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lowering cultural barriers to live and work in destination markets | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job search and acquisition • Job retention | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality Jobs, Digital Age Impact |

3.2.1 Providing legal pathways to move and work for migrants and refugees

Formal legal access to a labor market is a critical first step to help ensure migrant youth find quality jobs. Immigration policies in destination markets need to align with changing labor market realities around the world. This is especially true for migrants and refugees at the lower end of the skills spectrum. Programs such as H1B visa program in the U.S., or in the nursing sector worldwide, have facilitated pathways for high-skill immigrants to gain legal market entry; but legal entry provision for lower-skilled workers are rare. This is often due to political economy or societal constraints; host or local populations tolerate high-skill labor flows better than flows of low-skill migrants. As a result, low-skill migrants face significant obstacles in the form of both limited formal labor market access and high recruitment costs in exchange for access. As such, they often struggle to gather enough resources to move, and even when successful in entering destination areas, they face discrimination and rigid structures. However, some receiving markets, are addressing low-skill worker shortages in innovative ways.

In a number of high income countries, migration visa regimes allow temporary, repetitive migration across borders and/or seasonal migration. As Wickramasekara revealed (2011) the numerous tradeoffs such as in educational loss, risks to violation of labor rights and exploitation often associated with these schemes which underscore the need for long-term policies and solution. The problems also highlight the importance of safeguarding international labor standards and the fundamental principles and rights of young people at work through social protection, enforcement and access to legal remedy for victims of workplace rights abuses.

To address lost schooling or training, receiving nations could for example accompany seasonal migration programs with educational commitments. Canada actively encourages long-term immigration of high-skilled workers while its Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) allows for seasonal migration of low-skilled workers from Mexico and Caribbean

countries to work on annual harvests (Basok 2003). However, the SAWP program has had its shortcomings and has been cited for health and safety violation, a structure of dependency that silences worker voice and protest, lack of insurance or other social protections and other rights violations (Wickramasekara 2011). It is of primary importance that seasonal schemes, such as the SWAP, include basic human and labor rights standards to protect workers so they can be mutually beneficial for both the young workers and their employers.

The World Bank helped design the Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) program in New Zealand to bring workers from the Pacific Islands to address labor shortages in the horticulture and viticulture industries. An evaluation of this program found that it led to significant poverty reductions, while displacing few New Zealand workers, and resulting in few instances of exploitation. This scheme has been particularly successful as it heavily demand-driven and involved employers at every stage of design and implementation. In contrast, many countries, such as the U.S., do not adapt labor admission policy to labor market needs. These countries often experience large numbers of irregular migrants as employers have an incentive to hire outside the confines of the law, or alternatively, the countries experience labor shortages as employers do not have access to adequate supply. While most temporary labor migration programs designed for low-skilled or poor migrants are only able to offer circumscribed access to rights and services, it is also important to realize that there are very few high-income countries that have well-designed programs specifically targeting migrants at the lower end of the skills spectrum, and more effort is needed in terms of bilateral schemes to expand and improve temporary or circular migration programs for the poor and low-skilled.

Legal entry mechanisms are also critical for migrants to access other elements of the migration system. For example, the Korean Employment Permit System (EPS) simultaneously creates a legal pathway to entry for migrants, and also offers pre, during, and post-departure training for migrants. The EPS is a non-seasonal, temporary labor migration scheme that operates through bilateral government-to-government memoranda of understandings (MOUs). The MOUs lay out the responsibilities of each government, including coordination mechanisms regarding recruitment, selection, placement, protection, and work-related benefits of migrant workers bound for Korea. Non-governmental actors and even some private service-providers often prepare potential EPS workers ahead of the selection process, or facilitate workers' adjustment to life in Korean society, such as providing Korean language lessons. The system is designed to reduce the risk of exploitation and abuse.

Temporary migration regimes are attractive to host governments as they reduce incentives among migrants to bring their dependents, reducing burdens on local public services, while enabling flexible responses to labor shortages. Temporary migration regimes are often part of a two-tiered system in which highly skilled people are encouraged to stay (for university study and work) while those with lower skills are given only temporary visas for short term work.

To ease movement of labor across countries, countries have established Regional Economic Communities (REC) ensuring legal status and full rights for migrants from member countries. The E.U. is an obvious example, but there are numerous RECs across the world, including the well-established Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) UNHCR 2008; Global Migration Group 2014). In most RECs, however, equality of migrant rights and

access remains mostly *de jure* rather than *de facto*. Further, many of these agreements are yet to be fully implemented.

Chapter One highlighted that youth significantly outnumbered adults in the net flow of migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2010 and 2015. The East African Community's (EAC)—made up of the countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—Common Market Protocol allows workers from any partner state to work within any other without discrimination. The worker has a right to social security benefits and can bring spouse and children, but cannot work in public service, unless approved by the partner state. Using International Labor Organization (ILO) classifications, the partner states have agreed to open certain work categories, and to collect and disseminate information to facilitate access to jobs. But despite coming into force in 2010, the Protocol is not yet fully implemented. For example, under the Protocol a worker with an employment contract is entitled to apply for a work permit within 15 days of entry into, or securing work within, another partner state, but Chapter 53(5) of the Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act prohibits entry of a person intending to take up employment in Uganda until such person has been granted a work permit.

In many cases, undocumented migrants and displaced persons do not have legal access to the formal labor market, pushing them into the informal economy or unemployment. For example, Syrian refugees, the majority of whom are children and youth, have not been able to obtain work permits to legally work in Turkey. Despite government plans to provide work permits to discourage Syrian illegal migration to the E.U., only about 2,000 out of Turkey's 2.7 million Syrian refugees, as of April 2016, have applied.²⁹ A number of restrictions limit access to the work permits, such as the fact that Syrian refugees can only obtain them with support from a Turkish employer offering a concrete contract, and that is only possible if less than 10% of the firm's workforce is from Syria.

Besides preventing pathways for refugees to gain legal work status in Turkey, these kinds of restrictions are also pushing refugee children and youth below age 18 into informal work.³⁰ Children under 18 are less susceptible to getting caught by Turkish authorities and can help families by earning income when adults are barred from working legally. But the children risk exploitation, and lose valuable formative schooling.

In some contexts, labor market options for internal, rural-to-urban, migrants are also restricted by laws or regulation. The most well-known example of this is China, where for decades the *hukou* residency permit system prevented migrants from accessing jobs in the formal economy and public sector jobs in cities (UNDP 2009). As a result, migrants are obliged to accept less desirable work often in the informal economy.

Innovative financing options at source markets can help youth with high migration costs. For example, lack of economic opportunities for youth in Bangladesh increases the attractiveness of jobs abroad. The 2015 S4YE flagship report on youth unemployment pointed out that compared to 88% of the population, only 69% of Bangladeshi youth were working. Due to growing labor

²⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/11/fewer-than-01-of-syrians-in-turkey-in-line-for-work-permits>

³⁰ <https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/blog/bbc-panorama2019s-investigation-and-the-syrian-refugee-workers-in-the-turkish-garment-industry>

migration in Bangladesh, BRAC launched a practical and affordable migration loan service. BRAC offers a customized loan of on average USD 2,300 to two co-borrowers, and offers a pre-migration orientation. To safeguard against fraud, BRAC examines the validity of travel documents and contracts. Clients then use a portion of the loan to travel abroad, and a co-borrower in Bangladesh pays monthly loan installments to BRAC for 12-24 months. Migrant households at home receive monthly remittances, and the remaining loan amount allows households to maintain spending until the working migrant(s) begin earning money. When the loan is paid off, remittances are invested in assets, enterprises, and household consumption. BRAC also offers post-migration, re-integration training. Between June, 2014 and June, 2015, BRAC made loans to 8,000 households, and as of May, 2015, BRAC has helped 128,000 migrant workers find work abroad.

Key Messages:

- Temporary or circular migration schemes can represent a win-win for both sending and receiving markets addressing youth unemployment in sending markets and labor shortages in receiving markets. However, institutions in source and destination are needed and international labor standards enforced to protect youth exploitation and abuse.
- Regional Economic Communities (REC) can increase cooperation for youth migration among member countries. However, these policies must be fully implemented, and harmonized with member country policies.
- Providing legal pathways to work for forcibly displaced persons and refugees increases the probability of working in formal employment, decreasing the likelihood that refugee youth will be pushed into informal work.
- Many youths from developing countries are unable to migrate regularly because of the prohibitively high costs of migration. A well-designed migrant loan product, such as BRAC in Bangladesh, can allow low-income youth to migrate for employment while keeping the default risk low for lenders.

3.2.2 Improving access to employer and destination-specific training and certification

Skills training should address labor market shortages in target destinations. A 2012 German law showed where these efforts can fall short. The legislation called for nuanced evaluation of labor needs, including identifying skills gaps and occupational language skills, but training institutions and employer apprenticeship programs did not adapt to accommodate the changes the screenings revealed (Benton et al 2014b). In contrast, a consortium of municipalities run “Swedish for Professionals” program, a comprehensive program to assist immigrants who already have some skills and experience in trades such as truck driving and carpentry (Benton et al 2014b), though the relevance of this model for youth or low-skill migrants is likely limited.

More specifically, Germany experienced a shortage of geriatric nurses, while a study by the *German Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy (BMWi)* found that, due to an aging workforce, it was not possible to make up this shortage solely with German nurses.³¹ BMWi launched a pilot project in the second half of 2013 whereby a small group of young Vietnamese

³¹ <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/18715.html>

completed a state-funded, six-month language course at the Goethe-Institut in Hanoi, and received vocational training in small groups at care homes in Germany. During training, they also took part in additional language courses and intercultural programs to help them adjust to life in Germany. Regional coordinators and mentors who speak Vietnamese support the trainees and their partner organizations to gain command of the job and related theoretical content. The success of the first pilot was followed by a second, after which the program was adapted for future trainees to include a one-year intensive German language course to foster required proficiency (“level B2”), and improvement to the intercultural programs.

Similarly, several German companies offer migrant and refugee internships and training programs. Daimler offers “bridge internships” to refugee youth into the car industry, starting with 40 individuals in the first pilot in November 2015, and growing to about 300 refugees in the first half of 2016.³² The majority of participants in the pilot program obtained job offers through temporary employment agencies in industry, trade, or craft businesses. In another effort, about 100 German companies joined Wir Zusammen, or “We Together”, an effort to integrate new arrivals that has connected 1,800 refugees with internships and 300 with apprenticeships.³³ Finally, Price Waterhouse Coopers created a six-week program offering language classes and courses explaining the German labor market and the range of available jobs to new asylum seekers awaiting approval for labor market entrance. At the end, participants get a certificate attesting that they are qualified for entry-level employment.³⁴

Internal migrants also need skills matching support to ensure market-relevance. *Jeevika’s Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project*, a Government of the Indian State of Bihar initiative supported by the World Bank³⁵, is a community-driven poverty alleviation project working in 400 villages and covering 700,000 households. Only 5% of internal migrants in Bihar are skilled, but skilled migrants earn more than twice the amount of low-skill migrants. The *Jeevika* project promotes market-linked skills enhancement and placement of Bihari migrant workers in collaboration with private companies. These companies conduct job fairs in source locations of Bihari migrants, providing employees with information on workplace, hostels, and other facilities, and informing youth regarding the salaries and incentives offered. *Jeevika* supports these companies through the recruitment process, ensuring that community resource persons counsel the youth.

Employers in target labor markets must be involved in the design of portable skills systems that help migrants find work within their skill areas. For example, the *Philippines Technical Education and Skills Development Authority* succeeds in facilitating migration for employment because administrators ensure that its certificates issued are recognized and valued in a variety of labor markets.³⁶ Program architects carefully cultivate TESDA’s reputation through professional and personal relationships, encouraging employers to seek TESDA-certified workers. As evidence

³² <http://media.daimler.com/marsMediaSite/en/instance/ko/Internship-at-Daimler-builds-bridge-into-German-job-market-f.xhtml?oid=9920072>

³³ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-28/germany-ramps-up-internship-programs-for-refugees>

³⁴ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-28/germany-ramps-up-internship-programs-for-refugees>

³⁵ <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P090764/bihar-rural-livelihoods-project-jeevika?lang=en>, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002237/223702e.pdf>, <http://brlp.in/>

³⁶ <https://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/Creating-Valuable-Skills-A-New-Framework-for-Migration-as-Development-Policy-May-2013-SecureJune23.pdf>

of employers' positive perception of TESDA, some foreign employers send their Filipino workers back to the Philippines to update their TESDA certifications. Because industries in receiving countries such as Germany and Saudi Arabia value TESDA certificates, Filipinos planning to work abroad view TESDA certification as a first step to migration. TESDA's efforts have repeatedly targeted out-of-school and unemployed youth to provide them with technical and vocational training.³⁷

Skills training schemes that fail to include employers in receiving markets are unlikely to place workers abroad. In 2007, the Government of Australia cooperated with Pacific Island governments to launch the *Australian-Pacific Technical College*.³⁸ Through a network of training institutes in seven Pacific Island Countries, the college aimed to prepare Pacific Islanders to work seasonally in New Zealand and Australia. Though APTC's aimed to benefit both sending and receiving countries, neither the Australian nor the Pacific Island Country governments report satisfaction with results of the program: only 1.8% of APTC graduates have migrated to any country in the five years since the program's inception. While APTC certifies graduate "in-demand skills", the lack of relationship building with employers in Australia left Australian employers distrustful of these qualifications. This illustrates that skills training programs for young migrants should be developed in close coordination with employers.

³⁷ <http://www.gov.ph/2011/08/12/tesda-promotes-entrep-techvoc-training-among-osys/>

³⁸ <https://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/Creating-Valuable-Skills-A-New-Framework-for-Migration-as-Development-Policy-May-2013-SecureJune23.pdf>

S4YE Partners Promote Skills for Migrant Youth in China

In coming years, training in services is likely to become increasingly important, as most migrants are moving to urban areas where the service economy dominates. Plan China, launched in April 2016, focuses on professional training in services, particularly for young female migrants. The project currently targets 900 young migrants aged 16-40 in Beijing, 80% of whom are female. The professional training curriculum includes elderly care skills, as this industry is projected to grow rapidly. The project also connects previous students who serving as mentors to current students through a digital platform.

Similarly, with help from the Accenture Foundation, Save the Children is working with young migrants to give them the vocational and life skills they need. The pilot project, part of Save the Children's 'Children on the Move' program, aims to provide 10,000 young migrants (aged 14-24) in Shanghai and Beijing with career planning, job and life skills. Accenture Development Partnerships has teamed with Save the Children to monitor and evaluate the project's impact.

The Rural Migrants Skills Development and Employment Project, supported by the World Bank, sought to combat the skills gap by furthering vocational training to help rural migrants search for superior jobs, higher incomes and better working conditions. From 2009-2014, the project was implemented in the three provinces of Anhui, Ningxia and Shandong. Impressive results can be seen for example from Anhui province where nearly 60,000 young rural migrants received training from the ten schools supported by the project, the percentage of graduates entering employment within six months increased from 51 percent to 98.2 percent, 98 percent of graduates obtained national occupational qualification certificates - an increase from 50 percent, the initial wage of graduates more than doubled from 1,430 yuan to 3,300 yuan a month, and the number of full-time students in school nearly tripled from about 8,000 to nearly 22,000. Not only did the project further vocational training, but it also supported entrepreneurial opportunities for thousands of young migrants.

For young migrants with preexisting skills, harmonizing skill certification systems across borders is critical to being able to deploy their skills in destination markets. Migrants often end up underemployed in positions that, which do not fully use the skills they possess. Many migrants arrive in host countries armed with an impressive résumé, only to learn that their foreign credentials are not recognized by the host country employers. Cross-border differences in certification standards and qualifications dramatically increase the information asymmetries surrounding a worker's true skill level and productivity. Harmonizing skill certification standards between source and host countries can help to improve migrant-employer matches while making it easier for migrants to secure jobs.

The population of the Regional Municipality of York in Canada is 43% foreign born, making labor market integration particularly important.³⁹ The Human Resources department of the York Region chose to develop a foreign credential process guide. As it was not able to find a preexisting

³⁹ http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/getting-credit-for-credentials/, <http://www.hireimmigrants.ca/2013/06/17/york-region-ensures-effective-hiring-with-foreign-credential-process-guide/>

evaluation tool for foreign credentials, the York Region developed its own, the Foreign Credentials Evaluation Process Guide, which is now widely recognized as a best practice. The Guide outlines when and how to assess foreign credentials, scenarios, templates for assessment requests and other resources. York Region is already seeing a growing number of skilled immigrants within its workforce, and 27% of the York's workforce now consists of immigrants who speak more than 60 languages.

Key Messages:

- Technical and vocational training for youth migrants need to be tailored towards the demand of employers in destination markets.
- Along with technical skills, vocational training providers are increasingly realizing the importance of soft, socio-emotional and cultural skills to smooth youth migrants' transition from source to destination markets.
- Too often, highly qualified youth migrants are barred from accessing employment opportunities that matches their skills in destination markets because of differences in certification standards between sending and receiving places. Trans-national certification standards could allow young migrants to access jobs that matches their qualification, skills, and productivity levels.

3.2.3 Reducing information asymmetries, service provision through digital platforms

Information gaps between employers and mobile job seekers are being addressed through the combination of technological and humanitarian advances. SoukTel Digital Solutions has developed a mobile job platform "JobMatch" to connect job seekers and employers.⁴⁰ Through the platform, a job-seeker can create a "mini-CV" via SMS, which is uploaded to a database where employers can also post jobs outlining skills required, place of work, hours per week, and related information. The database pairs CVs and Job Ads and alerts both employers and job seekers of a possible match, including information on the position and a contact number to set up an interview. The system helps bridge gaps between job seekers and job openings, and could be particularly useful for helping prospective or newly arrived young migrants find jobs in a new foreign labor market. Job-seekers from poor rural communities and those currently in refugee camps in Palestine are the main beneficiaries of the program. The mobile nature of the platform allows the job seekers to connect to jobs in other labor markets, making it a critical tool for improving outcomes for youth in foreign labor markets.

Talent Beyond Boundaries has created an online portal to connect displaced persons with employers in host communities. Their pilot project benefits Lebanese and Jordanian refugees and displaced people, especially youth.⁴¹ Data collection is conducted via a web application which gathers information on employment experience, credentials, education, and language capabilities. The aim of the online catalog is twofold: first to demonstrate to employers the valuable refugees

⁴⁰ <http://www.souktel.org/>, <http://www.souktel.org/media/news/souktel-and-mit-bring-digital-outsourcing-work-youth-palestine-mobile>

⁴¹ <http://www.talentbeyondboundaries.org/pilot-project/>

and displaced persons' skills; and second, to match qualified refugee employees to job requirements of hiring employers. Talent Beyond Boundaries will also facilitate skills, language, and identity verification for candidates that match employers' hiring needs. The pilot project is currently being conducted with 30 migrants in Jordan and Lebanon, with plans to scale the project to include tens of thousands of displaced job seekers.

Similarly, Accenture recently launched a "Refugee Talent Hub"⁴² a network and digital platform business, government, education, and development sector stakeholders. The Talent Hub builds a digital profile for refugees and matches them based on relevant skills with potential employers for internships, apprenticeships, and jobs. This program also leverages Accenture's other interventions to create what it calls "meaningful waiting"; while refugees searching for jobs, they also have access to Accenture's courses, training, education, study, or work orientation and volunteer work to increase their employability. In 2015, Accenture developed an Online Employment Training Program in partnership with Upwardly Global.⁴³ This program helps skilled immigrants and refugees rebuild their professional careers through access to free interactive trainings on job search skills, resume writing, interviewing and networking.

Technology is also being deployed in some places to reduce information asymmetries and increase social protection for migrants. Information and communication technology is transforming the migration experience for young people by facilitating information flows about economic opportunities between youth in home areas, whether home countries or rural areas, and friends and family in destination areas. LabourNet, a non-profit in Bangalore, India, helps informal sector workers access services and protection mechanisms.⁴⁴ Among its solutions, LabourNet identification database links to other services for internal migrants and informal workers. Through its network of Worker Facilitation Centers throughout the state of Karnataka, LabourNet registers informal workers, including many internal migrants, and collects information on the worker's qualifications, experience, family details, and proof of address. This information is entered into a central database that links to services such as accident insurance, identity cards, and bank accounts. Having this information digitized and centralized provides a safety net, helping

Connectivity to Support Young Refugees

Accenture's Accenture Development Partnerships (ADP) is working with the UNHCR to support refugee well-being and livelihoods. ADP is undertaking a global assessment of refugees' access to, and use of, the internet and mobile phones to help UNHCR develop its Global Strategy for Connectivity for Refugees. By leveraging these technologies, young refugees will be better equipped to support themselves and their communities, and to access humanitarian support.

Source: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/5770d43c4.pdf>

facilitate internal migrants' access to key services they often lack.

⁴² <https://www.refugeetalenthub.com/home/>

⁴³ <https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/accenture-to-help-upwardly-global-expand-jobs-training-program-for-immigrants-and-refugees-in-the-us.htm>

⁴⁴ <http://labournet.in/>, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/internal-labor-migration-india-raises-integration-challenges-migrants>

In addition to its SMS job-matching service highlighted above, Souktel has also used its digital platform to reduce information asymmetries related to legal aid and services for Syrian refugees. Souktel and the American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI) have partnered⁴⁵ to launch a cell phone-based legal information service, through which Syrian regimes will be able to ask legal questions through SMS to a secure, Souktel-designed analytics platform. These requests are sorted, translated into Turkish, and forwarded to Turkish lawyers, who then offer timely legal advice translated back to Arabic through again through SMS. The service launched in August, 2015, and requests for assistance and responses surpassed 200,000 messages as of September, 2016. Some 10,000 Syrian refugees have used the service, and usage is increasing.⁴⁶

Social media campaigns and technological advances are helping reduce undocumented, forced, or unsafe migration, smoothing the immigration process across the world. To reduce unsafe migration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the MDG Achievement Fund's *Youth Employment and Retention Programme* social media campaign began providing potential migrants with information on visa-free regimes and risks surrounding trafficking.⁴⁷ The program—implemented primarily by UNDP in collaboration with UNICEF, UNV, IOM, and UNFPA—published information on Facebook related to the risks and disadvantages of irregular migration and advantages of regular migration for youth reached, which reached more than 12,600 young people. Additionally, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Ministry of Human Rights Diaspora Sector conducted a widely disseminated, online survey of youth migration experiences and possibilities, and published the survey results on migrant returns and reintegration online and in a hardcopy handbook.

To address lack of awareness about the risks of irregular migration for young, prospective migrants, the ILO in partnership with the Government of Peru created Infomigra, an information and orientation service for young Peruvians planning to migrate, migrants living abroad, and potential returnees. The service aims to provide reliable information on employment opportunities and counseling services on return migration. Infomigra's service is managed by Peru's Ministry of Labor through a web portal and includes information about returnees' experiences and contributions from the Peruvian Diaspora. This service is invaluable as it allows young workers the chance to more accurately evaluate employment options in addition to providing information to help find a job abroad.

Promoting Social Protection for Young Migrants

Young workers in particularly vulnerable occupations often need special protection. For example, many countries have developed interventions to protect young women migrating as domestic workers. In Paraguay, a joint program with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) advocated for the labor rights of domestic workers abroad. The staff of the National Directorate for Migration and Employment and the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs developed policy initiatives to protect their legal rights. Support services piloted under this joint program provide information, guidance and job placement assistance to

⁴⁵ <http://www.souktel.org/media/news/syrian-refugees-aba-souktel-launch-mobile-legal-info-service>

⁴⁶ <http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/looking-back-moving-forward/refugees-and-the-technology-of-exile/>

⁴⁷ <http://www.mdgfund.org/program/bihyouthemployabilityandretentionprogramme>

domestic workers. Additionally, the program established specific consular services to protect domestic workers abroad.

Migrant origin countries now offer online public employment service platforms specifically for overseas employment. The Philippines Overseas Employment Agency curates a registry of all approved positions available through its recruitment agencies. Anapec in Morocco also runs an electronic registration system for foreign employers and Moroccan youth, which significantly eases job matching. The *Tunisian Agence Tunisienne de Coopération Technique* (ATCT) maintains a database of thousands of curriculum vitae of migration candidates; it also accesses the public employment agency database to search for additional candidates. Since ATCT's creation, it has facilitated placement of 30,000 Tunisian experts. The agency arranges thousands of placements every year, and roughly 10,000 Tunisians are currently working abroad under its temporary work program. The broader public employment agency (ANETI) also help place Tunisian workers internationally by asking employment candidates specifically via questionnaire whether the job seeker wishes to work abroad. All Tunisian employment offices now have an international placement focal point. As discussed in Chapter Two, however, young migrants often do not have access to public employment services in receiving countries. To address the barriers, some PES make systematic efforts to help migrants. For example, Sweden has taken steps to ensure that new arrivals connect with employment services earlier than they would have otherwise. Germany's IQ network has initiated diversity training for staff to better understand migrants' needs and deal with cultural differences.⁴⁸

Digital work opportunities are increasing for youth, and online platforms represent particular opportunity for migrant and refugee young people. Samasource, a platform highlighted in S4YE 2015, collaborated with Google and others to develop the SamaHub technology platform, which deconstructs complex data projects into small tasks that can be performed remotely by youth in developing countries.⁴⁹ These youths are trained in basic English and data skills at Samasource partner delivery centers. Samasource partners are required to reinvest at least 40% of revenue from these projects in training, salaries, community programs, and hiring of workers whose earnings previously had placed them under the local poverty line. Samasource workers in six countries have generated over a quarter of one million dollars in sales working for clients like Google and the Stanford University Library.⁵⁰ Samasource's model could potentially expand to offer work to refugees living in camps far away from economic centers, or to connect newly arrived young migrants with work while they search for longer-term employment.

⁴⁸ <http://www.netzwerk-iq.de/network-iq-start-page/network-iq/programme-description.html>

⁴⁹ <https://challenges.openideo.com/challenge/refugee-education/research/samasource-empowering-through-digital-work>,

⁵⁰ <http://boingboing.net/2009/11/16/teaching-refugees-ho.html>

Key Messages:

- Information asymmetries are now increasingly addressed through digital platforms. Policymakers in destination communities are providing reliable information regarding the costs and risks of migration process to migrants and refugees who increasingly have access to mobile phones. This is helping vulnerable groups such as youth evaluate employment options between source and destination markets.
- In the absence of traditional employment services, digital job-matching platforms are substantially reducing job search-costs for young migrants and refugees. By helping migrants and refugees access information about job listings that match their skills and preferences, organizations like *SoukTel*, *Talent Beyond Boundaries*, and *Accenture* are all doing their part in helping migrants find employment in destination communities.
- Traditional employment service platforms are also incorporating new data and technology approaches that help migrants access employment opportunities in receiving communities. It is also important for platforms to incorporate information on labor rights to avoid further vulnerabilities among young migrants.
- Online platforms are helping youth migrants connect to potential employers from all over the world, and are also providing social protection by letting youth migrants access valuable services in destination markets. At the same time, further work is needed to enhance monitoring and protection mechanisms to ensure compliance with international labor standards.

3.2.4 Reducing financial and experiential barriers to entrepreneurship and self-employment

Banking and financial institutions are offering specialized products and services to migrants.

As discussed in Chapter Two, access to credit and finance and lack of experience represent significant barriers migrants, especially youth who do not have credit histories. One organization that is addressing this constraint, *Scotiabank*, a Canadian bank with presence in more than 50 countries, offers banking advice and products for new immigrants, tailored by country of origin to serve a dozen different immigrant communities.⁵¹ These services allow newcomers to open bank accounts and develop credit histories even before they arrive in the destination countries. By facilitating credit histories and offering specific mortgage and loan products for newcomers, Scotiabank facilitates migrant financing of their first home in Canada, as well as significantly decreases barriers to entrepreneurship. Scotiabank also introduced the “We Speak Your Language” program through which migrants in Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary identify what languages are available among branch staff to support their communication and service needs. In the City of Calgary, for instance, bank employees have skills in 42 languages.

Business and enterprise information centers can help young migrants navigate regulatory hurdles. Migrant youth may need tailored counseling to navigate the challenges of starting a business in a new country. To address this challenge, EnterpriseHelsinki in Finland, created with the support from the Local Employment and Economic Development Office, provides entrepreneurship counseling to small businesses. In response to growing demand, the organization

⁵¹ http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/startright-with-scotiabank/, <http://www.scotiabank.com/ca/en/0,,4285,00.html>

has focused particularly on the needs of migrants.⁵² The program recruited business counselors with experience working with migrant populations, which allowed them to quickly identify commonly confusing issues or barriers. These business counselling sessions are available in Finnish, Swedish, English, Russian, Estonian, German and Arabic to be as widely accessible as possible. EnterpriseHelsinki also adapted entrepreneurship courses to inform newcomers about Finnish business regulations and labor law, and begin providing these services in Arabic and Russian. Finally, EnterpriseHelsinki helps migrant youth on all aspects of establishing, running, and developing a business, including writing an effective business plan to applying for start-up grants and loans. Each year migrant entrepreneurs use the services provided by EnterpriseHelsinki to establish about 400 new small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs,) with a survival rate of around 80%. In 2013, migrant entrepreneurs supported by the program in metropolitan Helsinki employed over 4700 people.

Destination areas have also begun recognizing the importance of helping recent migrants cultivate networks. For example, municipal authorities in Halifax recognized that skilled immigrants often lacked the information or personal connections to access emergent employment opportunities. They designed the Connector Program to correct this imbalance and take advantage of the underutilized skills of the migrant community.⁵³ Municipal officials partnered with local private sector leaders through the city's economic development cooperative and created formal and informal interviewing opportunities for newcomers. Through this program, local business and community leaders met with new skilled migrants in one-on-one meetings , helping the immigrants build a network and connect to career opportunities.

Ethnic networks offer critical support to new migrant entrepreneurs. Chinese New Settler's Services Trust (CNSST), established in 1998 in Auckland, offers new migrants with knowledge and skills to integrate into New Zealand society.⁵⁴ Soon after, CNSST began offering employment counseling and settlement services, as well as programs to teach fundamentals of business and entrepreneurship. Today, CNSST provides services to about 15,000 newcomers and community members annually.

*"Immigrant entrepreneurs know there are lots of excellent business services like Citizens Advice Bureau and Chamber of Commerce," said founder Jenny Chang, "But they need a bridge to help them get there. They need to talk to us in their own language, to gain a clear explanation to make things easy to understand."*⁵⁵

CNSST has succeeded in engaging members of the Asian business community to support newcomer entrepreneurs address business challenges. CNSST offers software training for small business accounting as well as accreditation on the software that meets New Zealand standards. It also offers workshops, forums, networking opportunities, and business promotion events.

Some programs take a "business incubation" approach guiding migrant youth through every step of the entrepreneurship process. In 2005, the *Centre d'Education et de Formation Interculturel Rencontre* (CEFIR, Intercultural Education and Training Centre Encounters)

⁵² <http://citiesofmigration.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/EnterpriseHelsinki-Presentation.pdf>.

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=181

⁵³ <http://www.halifaxpartnership.com/en/home/get-connected/connector-program/default.aspx>

⁵⁴ <http://www.cnsstei.ac.nz/>

⁵⁵ http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/helping-immigrants-become-kiwi-entrepreneurs/

launched *Cre'Action*⁵⁶ to support immigrant entrepreneurs and businesses. A follow-up program expanded to include communication and networking between successful, second-generation immigrant entrepreneurs and young immigrants from Northwest Africa. *Cre'Action* focuses on enterprises that bolster economic ties between France and Northwestern Africa. Once accepting a project into the program, CEFIR assists the young migrant entrepreneur to develop a business plan, and also offers six months of employment with CEFIR during which time the entrepreneur receives a wage in addition to profits. The young migrant then participates in an integration seminar and monthly follow-up meetings to report on project progress and to identify and discuss difficulties. A professional counsellor provides advice on issues, such as how to conduct a market study, find funding, and handle fiscal law, management, and business regulation. CEFIR also connects migrants with local partners to conduct market research and business incubation services. A program evaluation found that just over half of participants enjoyed long-term enterprise success; those whose business was not successful reported difficulties finding business premises, lack of funds, acceptance of a job.

Key Messages:

- After reaching destination countries, youth entrepreneurs face barriers such as lack of financing, credit history, and experience. By helping them navigate these barriers, organizations like *Scotiabank* in Canada and *EnterpriseHelsinki* in Finland are setting examples helping youth establish businesses in new countries.
- Incubating a migrant network, either by helping the members of the migrant community connect with each other or by establishing a mentorship program in which young migrants connect with successful entrepreneurs in their communities, can help solve the issues of network and information gaps.

3.2.5 Lowering cultural barriers to live and work in destination markets

Many programs build and strengthen ties between recently arrived migrant youth and their host communities. In this regard, sports programs or service learning projects can foster tolerance and teamwork, and bring together migrant and host population youth. When designed well, they can assist participating youth to gain employable skills. People-to-people exchanges can also aid integration. For example, in 2002 the city of Erfurt, recognized that it was experiencing significant growth in its population of international students. The city council, the University of Erfurt, the Erfurt University of Applied Sciences, and the Thuringian Institute for Continuing Education partnered to create a program to integrate international students into a welcoming environment. Together they created *Fremde werden Freunde* (Strangers become Friends), a program that launched a network of local hosts called “Ambassadors of Welcome.” The hosts come from all walks of life – families, single persons, retirees, and young people, politicians, business owners, and members of local civic clubs. These hosts conduct program activities including a welcome

⁵⁶ <http://copie.wikia.com/wiki/Cre'Action>

reception at the Town Hall, group field trips, workshops covering various aspects of cultural integration, language practicums, and cultural events.

In receiving countries, using anonymous applications procedures reduces employer discrimination toward migrants. For example, in the city of Gothenburg, two districts forming part of the local administration in 2004-2006 established Anonymous Application Procedure (AAP) to sorting applicants for first interviews.⁵⁷ Åslund and Nordström (2008) found that the program closes the discriminatory ethnic gap, making immigrants as likely as nationals to participate in interviews. However, results related to actual job offers are less positive; immigrants' probabilities of receiving a job offer have not increased.

Similarly, in 2010-2011 the German federal government's Office Against Discrimination initiated a pilot project to test bias in hiring with eight public and private employers using anonymous job applications.⁵⁸ The pilot tested a number of methods to reduce bias, including anonymizing personal details such as name, age, gender, and marital/family status, or using standardized application forms developed for the project. The pilot was so successful in reducing bias in the first round of hiring that the city of Celle, one of the public employer participants, decided to continue using anonymous application procedures after the pilot ended. The cities of Göttingen, Hannover, Mainz, Mannheim, Offenbach, and Nürnberg, as well as, eight German states also began using anonymous application procedures.

Key Messages:

- New migrants and refugees benefit from having an easy platform that allows them to connect with members of their ethnic community to ease transition into host societies.
- By anonymizing applications for employment, policymakers can help reduce employment discrimination and bias that migrant communities increasingly face in destination communities.

3.3 Future Considerations

This report lays a foundation for understanding the unique aspects of youth migration; the next step is to collect better data, pinpoint trends, and more fully evaluate policies and programs that inform and direct investments, and that can be implemented at scale. While this report attempts to shed light on fundamental the youth-employment-migration nexus and dynamics, as expected, it also surfaces more questions. These questions demand further exploration to find solutions for young migrants as a distinct group. These key questions that stem from this analysis shape the future youth migrant organizational research agenda.

The following research agenda has emerged in this report. Much of this research agenda aligns with the pre-existing S4YE eight-point research agenda presented in the flagship report. Outstanding S4YE questions about migrant youth include:

- What roles do expectations, perceptions and aspirations play in young people's access to employment?

⁵⁷ http://www.iza.org/conference_files/SPEAC2008/aslund_o2142.pdf

⁵⁸ http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/anonymous-job-applications-help-overcome-hiring-biases/

- How do the behavioral characteristics of youth affect choices?
- What are the barriers to adopting and scaling proven solutions for youth employment and how can they be overcome?
- We need to better understand why young people move and what they need, recognizing and accounting for youth personal, geographic, social, and cultural diversity.
- We need to know more about how gender factors in the youth-employment-migration nexus.

Reflections from the S4YE Flagship Report on the Limitations of Youth Data

“As much as can be gleaned from the current baseline, it is important to note the limitations and challenges in measuring and comparing performance on indicators and youth-development outcomes, especially with regard to disparities among youth. Comparing youth outcomes is complicated by the fact that there is variety among countries in how they statistically define youth. Moreover, the capacity for data collection is often weak in low-income countries. Further, data is not always collected on youth, nor necessarily disaggregated by age cohorts to allow a youth analysis. Most comparative global datasets are inadequately disaggregated by multiple factors to allow deeper analysis of the situation of segments of youth to ensure inclusion. For example, data may be available for youth vs. other age groups, and for male vs. female, but not necessarily for female youth vs. male youth, or rural male youth vs. urban male youth. Such limitations underscore the importance of S4YE’s call to action to improve our collective knowledge, monitoring, and data as proposed in the SDGs (target 17.8)”

Researchers need more age-disaggregated data for international and internal migrants. Even baseline age-disaggregated data on stocks and flows of migrants has gaps or is entirely missing for key corridors. Granular corridor-level data related to detailed age breakdown, gender, skill, and education are even less available. We need more research to understand employment opportunities for youth in their domestic markets, and how they compare to employment outcomes after migration, both in terms of level of employment and income. Similarly, we need to know more about youth migrant occupations and sectoral distribution relative to adult migrants and host or local youths. There is also very little data specifically on youth among forcibly displaced populations. On drivers of migration, we need more information particularly on economic drivers for young migrants, as wage differentials and employment outcomes are likely to differ significantly for youth rather than adult migrants. It is also important to understand the level of agency youth have in making the decision to migrate, and to what extent family pressure effects youths’ decisions to migrate differently than it for adult migrants.

Key research questions emerging include:

- How do youth migration trends vary across corridors and differ from those of adults; and what are any differences in trends for male versus female youth?
- What is the skill distribution of migrant youth; and what are any variances for young men versus young women?
- How much agency is associated with their responses? And what roles do expectations, perceptions, and aspirations play in young people’s access to overseas employment?

We need to know more about the unique constraints young migrants face, as well as the effects of these constraints. While Chapter Two laid out broad constraints we believe young migrants face, many of these apply to youth seeking employment and to the broader migrant population. What is not currently known is: which constraints are uniquely or most severe regarding effects on young migrant employment outcomes; and what are critical determinants of success. We need further evidence about costs and economic returns to youth migration. We also need youth-specific information on sending and receiving country effects.

Key research questions emerging here and adopted from the S4YE agenda include:

- What are the most binding constraints to employment and economic opportunity for migrant youth?
- How specifically do the constraints on migrant youth differ from those for adult migrants?
- How do changes in labor markets affect employment outcomes for young migrants?
- How do labor market regulations impact youth employment and youth migration?
- What are the economic, institutional and policy conditions that most directly affect employment outcomes for young migrants?

Finally, we need to know more about which emergent solutions can scale, and where. While the solutions we have highlighted have promise in addressing constraints to migrant youth employment, they have not undergone formal impact evaluation. This means that not only do we not know their specific effects or return on investment, but there is little information on critical determinants of their success or failure. For each solution, more information is required to know whether and in which contexts they are scalable, as well as how to adapt them for differing contexts or a subset of migrant youth. The research community needs to prioritize work to fill these knowledge gaps related to solutions. This agenda should flow from emerging information on the most binding constraints, as noted above.

Key research questions emerging here and adopted from the S4YE research agenda include:

- Which solutions are scalable to other contexts?
- What are the barriers to adopting and scaling up proven solutions for youth migration and employment, and how can they be overcome?

Despite information and knowledge gaps, several tactical considerations emerged from our primary research consultations with 25 practitioners and stakeholders regarding planning and design of employment interventions for young migrants. These include:

- Identify and communicate a balance between addressing young migrants or refugee needs and those of local or native populations.
- Tackle negative perceptions and attitudes towards young migrants and refugees.
- Bridge information gaps.
- Solicit young migrant perspectives and include youth in program or policy design, implementation, and evaluation.
- Consider regional responses and models for free movement of people.

- Set realistic targets.
- Prioritize collaborative and multi-stakeholder approaches, especially to foster scaling of solutions.

Though many solutions are promising, political economy considerations are likely to significantly hinder scale-ability. Despite the enormous benefits of migration to receiving host or local communities, provided observance of international labor standards and rights at work, many people remain deeply opposed to immigration due to concerns regarding negative labor market and fiscal effects, among others. This often makes it difficult even for supportive governments in receiving countries to openly implement migrant employment solutions, particularly in the short-term as governments are accountable to host or local population elections. While presenting significant challenges to implementing good practices, such as those identified in this report, past experience has demonstrated ways of designing migrant programs that are more palatable to host or local populations. For example, work with displaced populations in Jordan and Lebanon has demonstrated that host or local populations are far less resistant when services for refugees integrate with improved services for host or local populations. This highlights the importance of balance between addressing young migrant or refugee needs and those of local populations.

As the global community galvanizes around SDG target 10.7 to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies,” it is also developing a Global Compact on Migration. The World Bank and S4YE partners have ongoing work programs to improve employment outcomes and systems for young migrants. S4YE partners with strong work programs on youth employment interventions have also begun to extend into migration. The World Bank Social Protection and Jobs practice has large and growing work programs on both migration and youth employment. As introduced in this chapter, S4YE partners for youth on the move are adapting, piloting, and implemented emerging solutions. At the same time, gaps in evidence leave key questions unanswered, raise new questions, and point toward additional youth migration and employment research needs. S4YE will continue to invest resources along its eight-point research agenda. Partners within the World Bank and S4YE will use this analysis to connect and expand ongoing work on youth employment and migration. We invite the broader international community to leverage and utilize these insights to inform and advance their own efforts and employment initiatives for youth on the move.

Appendix A – Estimation Methodology and Data

Methodology for estimating Net Inflow and Outflow data

1. Introduction

To our knowledge, the two most expansive databases for international migration are the United Nations' UN Global Migration Database (UNGMD) and the International migration flows to and from selected countries database. The two main types of variables contained in these databases are: (1) country international migrant stocks data (the number of international migrants, foreigners, living in the referenced country), and (2) international flows data, outflows which refers to the number of migrants exiting(emigrants) and inflows, the number entering (immigrants) the country.

Ultimately we are interested in bilateral migration flow data disaggregated by age groups. This data was not publicly available. Available migration flows data is not bilateral, were not age-disaggregated, and were only for a select number of countries. On the other hand, the UNGMD database contained a dataset of country international migrant stocks disaggregated by age groups and, in a separate file, a dataset of total migrant stocks for each origin-destination pair (i.e. bilateral international migrant stock data). For our analysis, we estimated (1) age-disaggregated net inflow data for all available countries of the UNGMD, and (2) bilateral total flows data (not age-disaggregated) based on the UNGMD origin-destinations migrant stock data. Below we describe how we conducted these approximations. In Section 4 below we also discuss limitations of these estimates.

2. Methodology for estimating age-disaggregated net inflows data⁵⁹

The UNGMD age-disaggregated, international migrant stocks dataset contains information for a set of 232 countries for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 disaggregated to the following age groups: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, and 75 and older. We approximated the net number of migrants for each five-year period (1990-1995, 1995-2000, ..., 2010-2015) as follows:

For each age group $a \in \{0-4, 5-9, \dots, 70-74, 75+\}$ the stock of migrants at a given period of time is the sum of migrants already living in the country prior and entered the age group as a results of aging and new migrants of ages corresponding to that age group that entered the country during the period. If we let t represent a year such that $t \in \{1990, 1995, \dots, 2015\}$ the stock of migrants in age group a in period t can be represented by the sum

$$S_{t,a} = S_{t-5,a} + NI_{t,a}$$

where $S_{t,a}$ is the stock at time period t for age group a and $NI_{t,a}$ is the net inflow of migrants in the five years prior to period t . For each period, we observe $S_{t,a}$ and $S_{t-5,a}$ since they are

⁵⁹ The methodology we used is similar to the one described in UN (2011). Differences with the UN methodology (2011) are highlighted below.

included in the UNGMD and, therefore, are able to estimate $NI_{t,a}$. Moreover, the net inflow of migrants is determined by several factors that can be expressed as:

$$NI_{t,a} = B_{t,a} + E_{t,a} - X_{t,a} - D_{t,a}$$

Where $X_{t,a}$ represents the international migrants who exited the country for age group a in the five years prior to t ; $E_{t,a}$ the number of international migrants that entered the country in age group a in the five years prior to t , $D_{t,a}$ the number of migrants that deceased in age group a in the five years prior to t ; $B_{t,a}$ the number of migrants who were born into age group a in the five years prior to t (this only applies to age group 0 to 5 years old).

We are interested in the working age population, which includes the age groups 15-19 through 60-64. For these age groups $B_{t,a}$ is equal to zero and we anticipate that $D_{t,a}$ is a negligible number relative to $E_{t,a}$ and $X_{t,a}$. Therefore, we expect that for each age group of the working-age population the relevant determinants of net inflows are the entering and exiting migrants.

That the net inflows are fully attributed by the difference between a cohort's stock over time is a point of departure from the UN methodology (2011). In the paper the authors do not assume as applied here, that as a result of taking $D_{t,a}$ to be zero, the net inflows are the difference of migrant stocks of the same cohort between two points in time. Instead, the UN estimation (2011) uses survival probabilities to estimate the expected size of a cohort at a given time given the size of the cohort in the prior period. The assumption we apply in this paper is equivalent to having survival probabilities equal to 1.

Note that both of these quantities ($E_{t,a}$ and $X_{t,a}$) are greater or equal to zero so that it is possible that in some instances $E_{t,a} < X_{t,a}$ in which case we may see a negative net inflow of migrants for an age group for a specific period of time. For instance, in “changes of international migrant stocks” included in the UN's 2015 Revision of trends in the international migrant stock,⁶⁰ for multiple countries and regions they report negative changes in overall migrant stocks, including East Africa from 1990 to 2010, Northern Africa for 1990 to 2005, Eastern Europe from 1990 to 2010, and Latin American and the Caribbean 1990-2000 (including decreases for the separate regional estimates for South and Central America during the period).

Having estimates of $NI_{t,a}$ for each age group we can aggregate net inflows for several age groups to get at the net inflows of working age youth (15-30) and adults (30-64). These can be expressed as follows:

$$NI_{t,Youth} = \sum_{a=(15-19)}^{(25-29)} NI_{t,a} \quad \text{and} \quad NI_{t,Adults} = \sum_{a=(30-34)}^{(60-64)} NI_{t,a}$$

Where $NI_{t,Youth}$ and $NI_{t,Adults}$ represent the total net inflow of international migrants of working age youth and adults for period t . These net inflow numbers may be aggregated across countries.

⁶⁰ Number referenced are reported in Table 5 of United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015); Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015) available at <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml>

To compare country aggregates over time, it is important to have the same set of countries for each period. For the UNGMD that is age-disaggregated this is the case.

3. Methodology for estimating bilateral flows data

Bilateral flows data is also an important source of information, especially for understanding the magnitude of different migration corridors and South-South migration. The data available on migrant flows from the UN is only available for a subset of 45 case study countries, most middle or high-income countries. For each country, they provide the outflow and inflow of migrants. As mentioned, the UN also provides bilateral international migrant stock data for the years 1990,1995,2000,2005,2010,2015. From these data, we were able to estimate the total flow between two countries in various ways. Note, this data is **not** disaggregated by age group. At the most disaggregate level, if we take $S_{d,o,t}$ to be the stock of international migrants in country d from country o at time t then the net inflow of migrants from country o entering country d is

$$NI_{d,o,t} = S_{d,o,t} - S_{d,o,t-1} = NO_{o,d,t}$$

And this is equivalent to the net outflow of migrants originating in country o to country d at time t . Again, note that inflows refer to the flow of foreign migrants entering a country and outflows the flow of residents of that country migrating to other countries.

Using these bilateral flow estimates, we are able to aggregate into groups to glimpse broader patterns. As an example, to ascertain the flow of migrants from low-income countries (LICs) into high-income countries (HICs) we estimate the following expression:

$$NO_{LICs,HICs,t} = \sum_{j \in LIC} \sum_{i \in HIC} NI_{i,j,t}$$

4. Limitations to the estimates

For this report, we required indices that were age disaggregated and bilateral. Although we provide the best suited measures given the data available, some limitations beg for caution in interpretation.

First, circular migration is not captured since the UN data we use are collected every five years. Migrants who entered and left a country within one of the five-year spans data was collected, such as 2000 and 2005, were not captured. This may especially be pertinent for seasonal youth migrants.

Second, the estimates are not exact with regard to age groups. The net inflow estimates refer to how many people of the age group at the later point of the measurement window migrated over the prior five years. For example, for years 2000 to 2005, people whose age in 2005 were within the youth age group (15 to 29 years old), but were out of the age group at some point between 2000 and 2005, are counted towards the migration of youth between 2000 and 2005. The migration of someone at the age of 14 years in 2003 that is 16 years old at the time of measurement in 2005 would count towards the youth group's migration between 2000 and 2005; although not in the youth group when they migrated, they were in the youth group at the time of measurement. However, given that the age groups we use cover wide age ranges, 15 to 29 for youth and 30 to 64 for adults, this problem is less severe than in more highly disaggregated data estimates; for example, for age groups in five-year age intervals.

5. References

Reference for UN Global Migration database (UNGMD)

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015); Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015) available at: <https://esa.un.org/unmigration/>

The Documentation for the UN stocks data, including its construction, can be found at:

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/docs/MigrationStockDocumentation_2015.pdf

Reference for UN Flows Dataset:

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). International Migration Flows to and from Selected Countries: The 2015 Revision (POP/DB/MIG/Flow/Rev.2015) available at:

<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/empirical2/migrationflows.shtml>

Further documentation at:

<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/empirical2/docs/migflows2015documentation>

Data Appendix: Description of Census data and sample

Census data with the necessary information was available for 18 countries, in the form of 5 and 10 percent samples and with variables harmonized by IPUMS-International. The full sample of 18 countries included information for 69 million individuals. Internal migrants are defined as individuals who moved (ie. changed intended permanent residence) from one of the country's major administrative units to another recently (last year or five years, depending on information availability for each country). It was not possible to tell, with the data available, if migrants participated in urban-urban or rural-urban migration. Moreover, data for all 18 countries permits discerning between urban and rural locations at the time of the census with the exception of Uruguay and Zambia. It should be noted that in the graphs using data from these censuses we do not include international migrants in the sample population.

Description of census samples

| Country | Total sample size | Year | Time frame to be considered internal migrant (years since individual moved to current location) |
|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--|
| Armenia | 301,831 | 2011 | 5 |
| Cambodia | 1,340,121 | 2008 | 5 |
| Costa Rica | 430,082 | 2011 | 5 |
| Dominican Republic | 943,784 | 2010 | 5 |
| Ecuador | 1,448,233 | 2010 | 5 |
| El Salvador | 574,364 | 2007 | 5 |
| Indonesia | 23,603,049 | 2010 | 5 |
| Iran | 1,299,825 | 2006 | 10 |
| Kenya | 3,841,935 | 2009 | 1 |
| Malawi | 1,341,977 | 2008 | 5 |
| Mali | 1,451,856 | 2009 | 5 |
| Mexico | 11,938,402 | 2010 | 5 |
| Mozambique | 2,047,048 | 2007 | 5 |
| Panama | 341,118 | 2010 | 5 |
| Peru | 2,745,895 | 2007 | 5 |
| Uruguay | 14,177,590 | 2009 | 5 |
| Vietnam | 328,425 | 2011 | 5 |
| Zambia | 1,321,973 | 2010 | 1 |

Data source: IPUMS-International: Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.4 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015.

Appendix B – Key Informant Interviews

| Name | Title / Organization | Region |
|-----------------------|---|---------------------------|
| Ayaz Shalal Hassan | Deputy Director of Programs, Rasan Organization (a women's rights NGO) | MENA (Iraq) |
| Saddam Sayyaleh | Founder & Impact Strategist, I Learn Jordan - via IYF Youth ActionNet | MENA (Jordan) |
| Collins Kimaro | MasterCard Foundation Youth Think Tank researcher and Co-Founder of a new Youth Hub in Tanzania - via MCF | Africa (Tanzania) |
| Saied Sulaiman Tafida | Co-Founder, followtaxes.com - via Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) | Africa (Nigeria) |
| Mariam Aganze | USAid Institutional Strengthening & Evaluation Assistant, International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI) - via YALI | Africa (DRC) |
| Mario Patino | Economic Recovery & Development Coordinator, IRC Lebanon | MENA (Lebanon) |
| Myrna Evora | Indonesia Country Director , Plan International Asia | Asia (Indonesia) |
| Agung Vicky | Youth Economic Empowerment Program Adviser, Plan International Asia | |
| Wahyn T, | Program Strategy Manager, Plan International Asia | |
| Michelle Perrot | Advocacy & Public Partnerships Director, Plan International France | Europe (France) global |
| Ines Kwan | Migration & Solutions Specialist, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) Ethiopia | Africa (Ethiopia) |
| Hiwote Tadesse | Migration Project Officer, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) Ethiopia | |
| Basak Saral | General Coordinator, Habitat (YBI Turkey member) & Head of Livelihood Programme Targeting Entrepreneurship Skills And Business Creation (UNHCR funded) | Europe/MENA (Turkey) |

| | | |
|-------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Patrick Daru | Senior Skills & Employability Specialist, ILO Jordan | MENA (Jordan) |
| Brando Benifei | Member of Parliament, European Parliament | Europe (Italy) |
| Javier Omar Rodriguez Alarcon | Chief Advisor to Mexican Minister of Labor and Social Welfare | Americas |
| Andrea Riester | Adviser, Sector Project on Migration & Development, GIZ | Europe (Germany) / global |
| Sarah Neumann | Deputy Head, Sector Project on Migration & Development, GIZ | |
| Ann Miles | Director, Financial Inclusion & Livelihoods, MasterCard Foundation | Canada/N America (Sub Saharan Africa) |
| Wendy Chan | Strategy Senior Manager, Accenture Federal Services | North America |
| Yvonne Thomas | Director of Global Programs, Microsoft Citizenship and Public Affairs | North America / global |
| Jane Meseck | Director, Global Programs, Microsoft Philanthropies | |
| Patrick Taran | President Global Migration Policy Associates (and co-author GLOBAL MIGRATION GROUP 2014 Youth report) | Europe (France) / global |
| Dean Yang | Professor, Department of Economics and the Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan | North America / global |

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